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Editor’s note 
The following papers were commissioned as part of the Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, 
and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century project supported by the Project on Advanced Systems 
and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC).  
The papers have two general purposes: 1) to create a body of work that provides an overview of 
the missile defense developments in major regions of the world; and 2) to provide emerging 
scholars the opportunity to conduct research, publish, and connect with each other. We believe 
we have succeeded on both counts.  
The papers written for this project will be valuable for academics and policymakers alike, and 
will be published and disseminated by the Center for International and Security Studies at 
Maryland. This element of the project has also been successful in further bringing together a new 
cadre of experts in the field and developing the next generation of academics and public servants 
who will benefit from their participation in this project.  
These papers were completed in the Fall of 2016. 
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Missile Defense in Europe: Progress toward an Uncertain Outcome 
By Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Nilsu Goren, and Nate Frierson 
 
Executive Summary  
 
Even before its announced completion date of 2018, the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to 
regional missile defense in Europe can declare victory. So far it has been implemented close to schedule 
and below budget despite continuing problems related to cost, debates about financial burden sharing, and 
Russia’s warnings about its threat, real or imagined, to European security and stability. Russian aggression 
in Crimea and Ukraine and its intervention in Syria have helped to shore up broad political support for the 
project. The sharp tension trajectory of Russian-NATO relations and the need to reassure Eastern European 
allies does however mean that Russia and a few domestic critics will continue to see EPAA as a political 
lever to stoke the fires of uncertainty about U.S. commitment and to play on the fears in Eastern Europe of 
abandonment in their first hours of need should a Russian attack occur. 
 
Expansion of the EPAA’s capabilities beyond the current projected capability of the system by 2018 will be 
difficult given the costs and the competing demands for missile defense assets elsewhere around the globe. 
Barring any significant ratcheting up of Russian threats and other security risks in Europe, significant 
expansion of the EPAA is unlikely, but so is any reduction in commitment to the project as it stands now.  
 
However, there are many assumptions and challenges still to be discussed and confronted if EPAA is to 
fulfill all of the political and military expectations set first by the George W. Bush administration and the 
revised version under the Obama administration. This essay will examine each of these challenges in turn, 
and gauge the seriousness of the dangers and risks, both political and military, involved. There is little 
present evidence that the EPAA is at risk of drastic changes to its planned deployment, either in favor of 
increased capability or a decreased U.S. commitment to fulfilling the promises already made. This is as it 
should be. The EPAA, to quote Brad Roberts, is not a “fool’s errand.”i What remains to be seen is how the 
United States and NATO will address the challenges, old and new, that face the EPAA and indeed all 





The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), the missile defense network deployed 
through NATO and designed to defend Europe from limited ballistic missile attack, seems to 
have met almost all of its success metrics that were outlined in its initial plans under George W. 
Bush in 2007 and the revisions made by the Obama administration in 2009.ii With minimal 
difficulty, it has won most of its bureaucratic and Congressional battles within the United States 
and within formal and informal NATO sessions.iii Four Aegis-class destroyers have been 
permanently assigned to Rota, Spain, providing the EPAA’s sea-based component. The first 
Aegis Ashore system in Romania was declared operational in May 2016, and a similar 
deployment in Poland will likely be completed according to schedule in 2018. Integration with 
NATO’s Early Warning and Communications Systems through a new inclusive headquarters at 
Ramstein, Germany, and a new command at USNAVEUR at Naples are well underway. Major 
refitting of earlier Aegis vessels with supporting radars and also the active involvement of five 
major allies at sea, Spain, Norway, Holland, Italy, and the UK, are assured through the Maritime 
Theater Missile Defense Forum. 
 
Moreover, there have been a wide range of NATO and American training and integration 
exercises for EPAA, all completed at or above the satisfactory range.iv Given the threat of 
Russian aggression in Eastern and Central Europe and the impact of the Syrian civil conflict, the 
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reassurance value of the EPAA has increased. These negative trends in the international 
environment have increased EPAA’s value as a tool for developing popular confidence and 
psychological reassurance, especially since EPAA has come to be recognized not only for its 
protection against rogue missiles or unauthorized use, but also as a symbol of American 
commitment to Europe’s security.  
 
In contrast to earlier periods, all this has happened with a minimum amount of discussion and 
popular debate, let alone active political opposition. Russia’s behavior has certainly played a role 
in reducing criticism for the project, particularly in Eastern Europe, where the desire for greater 
American involvement in security affairs and for new evidence of full American commitment to 
their security has reached new highs. American public opinion has been more muted. But the 
consensus that any form of missile defense is a “good thing” and the chosen answer to any 
emerging crises remains strong, particularly among the relatively small and informal “missile 
defense caucus” in the House and the more assertive bloc of missile defense senators,v who may 
have greater influence with the new Republican administration than they did under the Obama 
administration. This is true even when the knowledge on Capitol Hill about specifics is generally 
lacking. 
 
The relatively smooth implementation of the EPAA so far is welcome news, although problems 
do remain along several key dimensions. After some initial flurries, these have largely not 
attracted direct attention given the distraction first of Europe’s financial crisis and now the 
unprecedented refugee waves, continuing fiscal uncertainties, and the new divisions within the 
EU framework. But these problems remain––problems that will affect the future of the EPAA 
and the entire integrated air and missile defense mission within Europe as well as signal likely 
difficulties with missile defense architectures in other regions of the world. Some are familiar 
from earlier BMD episodes: the inherent difficulty of missile defense still poses challenges, as do 
questions of cost-benefit and economic feasibility. Some challenges, however, are new, such as 
the ambiguous cost-benefit trade-offs involved in land-based deployments versus those at sea, 
competition with the BMD needs of other regions, and the suitability of a new range of 
capabilities under the new “third offset” strategy such as the long awaited rail-gun or the multi-
mission explosive rounds fitting a variety of already deployed Navy tubes.  
 
Last, but presently perhaps the most overwhelming, is the question of the special psychological 
impact of EPAA in the impending collapse of the European security structure that no longer 
seems to assume any active Russian involvement, or even grudging Russian acceptance. The 
immediate political mobilization effects hearten many decision makers, and public opinion 
continues to have little confidence in Russian words or behavior. But there are sober questions 
about long-term developments, from both military and political critics. Is EPAA “worth it,” in 
European or transatlantic terms, given scarce resources and a host of long postponed military 
requirements? Does EPAA have enough credibility with external foes? Do domestic populations 
see missile defense as an operational answer to renewed pressure, harassment, and low level 
escalation from infiltration, as seen in Crimea or Ukraine? 
 
This essay will examine each of these challenges in turn, and gauge the seriousness of the 
dangers and risks, both political and military, involved. The EPAA does not seem in imminent 
danger of major changes, either in favor of increased capability or a decreased U.S. commitment 
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to fulfilling the promises already made. This is as it should be. What remains to be seen is how 
the United States and NATO will address the challenges, old and new, that face the EPAA.  
 
 
The EPAA and Europe’s Slide into Turmoil  
 
The political ease with which the EPAA has been implemented so far owes a great deal to 
Europe’s focus on other, more pressing issues and to Russia’s belligerency, which shows no sign 
of abetting. Since the onset of the Great Recession in 2008, Europe as a whole has befallen tough 
economic times. The Eurozone debt crisis and the lack of economic opportunity across the 
continent have consumed the lion’s share of attention among European governments. The 
economic hardship across Europe has also sparked questions about the feasibility of the 
European Union as nationalism and populism continue to grow. In this chaotic environment, the 
European public has paid far less attention to U.S.-led security initiatives in Europe than it had 
during the Cold War. This is especially so because the United States is providing most of the 
funds for the project. If European defense budgets had to noticeably increase to fund the project, 
the EPAA would have likely been met with more opposition.  
 
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, belligerent rhetoric, and muscle flexing in Syria provided 
increased rationale for Eastern European countries to support EPAA and particularly to covet a 
permanent U.S. ground presence on their territory. In fact, enthusiasm for EPAA has much more 
to do with the intrinsic requirement for a “persistent” presence of U.S. forces in Eastern Europe 
than it does with protection from medium-range ballistic missiles, in the eyes of most Eastern 
Europeans. This has decreased the European criticism of the project that plagued the George W. 
Bush administration’s efforts. This is both a blessing and a curse. On the positive side, Russia’s 
actions have made the EPAA’s progress much easier to execute politically. European leaders 
need not worry about domestic opposition to the project stemming from concerns about 
provoking Russia.  
 
The flip side to this decrease in political opposition is that there may be greater demand for 
missile defense (and other forms of U.S. commitments that involve the stationing of U.S. assets 
and forces in Eastern Europe) that the United States may not wish to provide for reasons of 
optics and competition for BMD resources in other regions of the world. The demand for greater 
missile defense alone could cause substantial tension with Russia, and provide them with the 
justification they need, for example, to exit the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. They 
will claim, as they have already done, that the EPAA is simply laying the groundwork for a more 
robust missile defense capability that will in the near future threaten Russia’s strategic deterrent 
and its ability to strike Europe with its ICBMs. Even if the United States withholds such support 
for the increased missile defense requested by allies, Russia will surely use the support for 
further EPAA capabilities for propaganda purposes. It will also play into the paranoia that lurks 
in the background at the Kremlin.  
 
From this perspective, the lack of opposition to the EPAA—and the potential for increased 
demands and expectations down the road—could complicate U.S. and NATO relations with 
Russia even further, and be used by Russia as a justification to advance its agenda on the INF 
Treaty, for its persistent (and irresponsible) use of military aircraft and vessels to provoke and 
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irritate, and perhaps to claim ever greater “rights” over its near abroad. The present Russian 
government is clearly probing at all the edges of the previous security regime in Europe, as well 
as questioning or outright rejecting the basic agreements that undergirded that regime—no 
change of borders by force, respect for international law, and no permanent military deployments 
outside of national soil. While Putin’s Russia has not committed massive force or pursued new 
strategic directions, these circumstances bode ill for any easy or speedy return to a strategic 
partnership with the United States or Europe towards the goals set by Ronald Reagan and 
Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 at Reykjavik, “a Europe whole and free.”vi  
 
 
The Persistence of Familiar Problems 
 
Since the change of plans regarding the Third Site and the introduction of the phased adaptive 
approach policy, the EPAA has proceeded according to plan with far fewer hiccups than other 
comparable BMD programs.vii That being said, many of the same issues that characterized 
previous missile defense debates are beginning to appear again, though they have not yet been 
grappled with to the extent necessary due to Europe’s preoccupation with more pressing 
problems.  
 
One of these familiar problems is the question of cost. The complex nature of U.S. missile 
defense funding makes the true cost of missile defense to the United States difficult to calculate. 
Costs stemming from research and development, acquisition, and operations and maintenance 
are all associated with missile defense, even though these costs may be spread across different 
departments and programs. In addition, some programs have multiple purposes while other 
elements of the missile defense budget, such as surveillance and tracking, exist within the 
classified portions of the defense budget. Despite these complexities, when considered within the 
broader context of U.S. defense spending, missile defense makes up a relatively small and 
reasonable percentage of the overall defense budget. While the relative size of U.S. missile 
defense spending is modest, perceptions about the contributions of missile defense to U.S. 
security and strategic objectives will be what is most critical in determining the role of missile 
defense in the future.viii  
 
Estimating the costs of the EPAA has proven to be difficult as well. While the Defense 
Department has made lifetime operating and support cost estimates for the forward based radar 
and terminal high altitude defense (THAAD) systems, it has struggled to put forth a 
comprehensive cost estimate for Aegis Ashore.ix  
 
Funding for the Aegis BMD program comes mainly from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 
budget, with a smaller portion coming from the Naval budget. MDA’s budget includes funds for 
the two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania that are to be part of the EPAA.x 
Burden-sharing is another cost related issue that has arisen for the EPAA. Some observers have 
called for an increased investment in regional BMD from European members of NATO. Since 
the primary purpose of the EPAA is to protect Europe, they argue that the Europeans should 
share more of these costs.xi However, missile defense is no military industrial bonanza and 
doesn’t provide technology transfer incentives for allies.  
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The Emergence of New Problems  
 
In addition to the old set of problems that would accompany a greater demand for BMD in 
Eastern Europe vis-à-vis Russia, the EPAA also faces new challenges that will need to be 
addressed over the coming years.   
 
Demand for missile defense is increasing, both within the U.S. military and among allies. As the 
Aegis BMD system has proven itself, combatant commanders have demonstrated an interest in 
having a BMD capability in their theater. This has placed a great amount of stress on the Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy. To meet the requests of combatant commanders for 
missile defense, the Navy would need to allocate 77 Aegis ships to the BMD mission out of a 
total fleet of 84 Aegis ships.xii Most Aegis ships cannot currently perform this missile defense 
mission and other missions (such as cruise missile defense) simultaneously, meaning that 
meeting the BMD wishes of combatant commanders would prevent Aegis ships from performing 
other critical functions. In short, the Navy is currently unable to meet the demand for sea-based 
missile defense.   
 
This has increased the Navy’s enthusiasm for Aegis Ashore.xiii If further capability is added to 
the EPAA, the most cost-effective and militarily advantageous mix of sea-based and land-based 
Aegis deployments will need to be found. Sea-based and land-based Aegis missile defenses both 
have their strengths and weaknesses. Sea-based missile defense has the benefit of being able to 
defend ships from anti-ship missiles—a growing concern particularly in the Asia-Pacific. Sea-
based BMD is also mobile, allowing for a surge of BMD assets into conflict zones should the 
need arise. But these benefits are accompanied by significant drawbacks. As mentioned 
previously, most Aegis ships cannot perform BMD and cruise missile defense simultaneously, 
making the ships susceptible to an attack from both ballistic missiles and cruise missiles at the 
same time. Furthermore, the vertical launch system (VLS) on Aegis ships that launch the 
interceptors cannot be reloaded at sea, meaning a large salvo of incoming missiles could deplete 
the interceptors quickly and leave the ship and surrounding ships defenseless.xiv Land-based 
Aegis Ashore batteries can be reloaded with greater ease, but are not mobile and thus cannot be 
moved where they are needed most. The problem of allocating between land-based and sea-
based assets in a matter that meets operational requirements without breaking the Navy’s budget 
is a new challenge that will need to be managed over time.    
 
In addition to managing the allocation between land-based and sea-based assets, it will be 
imperative to limit the number of missiles that missile defenses will have to intercept in the first 
place. This is for three main reasons. First, sea-based missile defenses are limited by the number 
of interceptors they can carry onboard. Second, adversary arsenals are increasing in size, such 
that the volume of incoming missiles from a determined adversary would be sufficient to 
overwhelm missile defenses. And third, the current inventory of interceptors is costly, putting 
further strain on a military budget that has other modernization priorities.  
 
As the EPAA continues to evolve, so too will operational doctrines designed to reduce the 
number of incoming missiles. This will require the integration of other capabilities into the 
missile defense system, including non-kinetic capabilities designed to disrupt the launching of 
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ballistic missiles. There has also been talk of “left of zero” attacks, or striking an adversary’s 
missiles before they are launched. Advancements in precision-guided munitions and intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) have made such a comprehensive approach feasible.   
 
Advancements in precision and accuracy are also causing the defense establishment to look at 
creating new capabilities to augment or even eventually replace the current expensive and 
limited missile defense assets deployed today, such as moving toward the SM-6 or 5-inch guns to 
utilize existing and developing military technology for new uses. The Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is also working on developing artillery shells (which could 
potentially be launched by guns on naval ships) that would “combine the guidance, precision and 
accuracy generally afforded by missiles with the speed, rapid-fire capability and large 
ammunition capacity afforded by bullets.”xv 
 
Nearly seventy years of research has revealed a greater sense of technological limits in meeting 
the Aegis-based components of the current ballistic missile defense architecture. First, there is 
need for improved intra-defense communication and coordination to progressively integrate the 
various elements of the U.S. missile defense programs with allies and partners, not to mention 
the need for improved interoperability between U.S. BMD systems.xvi Second, the Aegis ships 
that are the backbone of EPAA cannot operate in a short time window without pre-delegation 
and, as of yet, cannot fulfill both the air defense and the missile defense mission at the same 
time. And third, there is need for stronger and larger radars mounted on naval vessels netted to 
the Aegis system to avoid the inconsistencies in cueing, as the current antennae cannot look on 
two levels simultaneously.  
 
In addition to the technical decisions on the configuration of land-based assets, the defense of 
Aegis Ashore sites while preventing escalation needs to be considered. In the current political 
context, what would be permissible under the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 
Cooperation, and Security between the Russian Federation and NATO if Russia threatened to 
attack an Aegis Ashore site? 
 
Beyond such a speculative scenario, the increasing tensions in Eastern Europe following 
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have increased the political support for EPAA, particularly among 
the Visegrad countries. In response, EPAA’s impact, if there is any, on Russia’s “escalate to 





The EPAA has already served a useful purpose within the NATO alliance. Its implementation is 
now a barometer of U.S. support for NATO, particularly its Eastern European members. 
Therefore, decreasing support for its stated objectives or failure to continue to implement the 
EPAA’s next steps will result in a perception that the United States is decreasing its support for 
Europe’s security at a time of significant threat and peril. It is thus necessary for the United 
States to fulfill its promises under the EPAA and work to achieve the capability that it promises, 
while recognizing that the main benefit of the EPAA to U.S. security guarantees is its ground 
presence.  
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However, an expansion of the EPAA’s capabilities, whether promoted by the United States or its 
European allies, could prove further damaging to already failing U.S.-Russian relations. As 
tempting as it may be, the EPAA should not be used as a leverage point with the Russians, lest it 
provide them with an excuse to enact their agenda or needlessly provoke the paranoid officials in 
the Kremlin, some of whom genuinely believe that Russia is “permanently encircled.”xvii  
If indeed further demonstrations of American security commitments to its allies are needed, other 
methods should be found. Some measures that the United States could take to credibly assure 
allies could include increasing transparency, maintaining open channels of communication, and 
support for Track 1.5 and Track 2 meetings. 
 
It should also be noted that the EPAA will not by itself address the security threats facing Europe 
today. Following the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine, the pressing issue in 
Eastern Europe is Russia’s use of hybrid warfare, unmarked Special Forces that became the 
infamous “little green men,” and Russia’s “salami tactics” to overcome opposition. It is unclear 
what level of NATO and American commitment is necessary to assuage Europe’s fears over 
Russia’s aggressive posture.  
 
These security threats are exacerbated by the ongoing economic and political crises across 
Europe that began as sovereign debt crises in the Eurozone and led to the rise of support for 
Euroskeptic parties and eventually Brexit. The migrant crisis that originated from Syrian 
refugees, combined with rise of xenophobia, homegrown radicalism, and terrorist attacks in 
Europe, has left the Schengen system of open borders shaken. Overall, these combined factors of 
stress threaten the EU framework, in which the divide between the net contributors and net 
receivers have deepened.  
 
It is thus critical for the United States to focus more of its foreign policy agenda on Europe in 
ways that address not just the perception of American security guarantees—as the EPAA does—
but the actual substance of the threats facing Europe. The new administration should continue 
with the plans already agreed to with the EPAA, but find other additional methods for making 
American security guarantees credible. The United States must also realize that missile defense 
will not serve as a substitute for tactical nuclear weapons in Europe or for a strong U.S. nuclear 





While the future resilience of missile defense programs will depend on critical technological 
development, budgets, and political alliances, the EPAA has secured enough capital and political 
support to survive. However, neither a significant increase in capability nor a drastic decrease in 
U.S. commitment to European allies in fulfilling the promises already made are likely. The 
political support for EPAA’s legitimacy, particularly among the Central and Eastern European 
allies, remains high in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. 
 
There are several decisions awaiting the new U.S. administration on missile defense and its role 
in transatlantic relations. Taking the strategic implications, costs, and technological needs behind 
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these decisions into consideration, the administration will have to balance between national 
missile defense programs and layered regional systems. The prospects for long-term success in 
regional missile defense goals with the EPAA depend on overcoming the old and new challenges 
on the adequacy of the technology, schedules, funding priorities, and burden sharing. How the 
United States and Europe tackle these challenges will have important implications for European 
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Turkey’s Turbulent Journey with the EPAA and Quest for a National System 




This paper provides an overview of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile defense 
debate from a Turkish perspective. While Turkey participates in the EPAA by hosting a U.S. early-warning 
radar in Kurecik, Malatya, its political and military concerns with NATO guarantees have led to the AKP 
government's quest for a national long-range air and missile defense system. However, Turkish decision 
makers' insistence on technology transfer shows that the Turkish debate is not adequately informed by the 





With Turkey being the closest NATO nation to the Middle East and lacking a robust integrated 
air and missile defense architecture, Turkish policymakers face decisions on continuing to rely 
on NATO resources, investing in indigenous capabilities, or procuring foreign systems. While 
the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands have historically provided Patriot systems to 
southeast Turkey, Turkey has political and technical concerns about NATO guarantees under the 
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), leading to the proposition that Turkey needs to 
develop indigenous air and missile defense capabilities to reduce vulnerability. However, 
Turkey’s controversial tender for the foreign acquisition of a long-range air and missile defense 
system, dubbed the T-LORAMIDS process, has led to concerns within NATO about Turkey’s 
strategic orientation and intentions. 
 
This paper first identifies the missile threats to Turkey, mainly from Syria and Iran. It then 
defines Turkey’s role in the EPAA and the Turkish activities towards procurement of a national 
long-range air and missile defense system that would allow for technology transfer to eventually 
achieve indigenous design. The main roadblocks to Turkish missile defense are the EPAA’s 
technical limitations in providing continuous, comprehensive coverage to the entirety of Turkish 
territory, Turkey’s insistence on domestic production that has led to the consideration of non-
NATO systems, interoperability, and political issues. While Turkish authorities remain skeptical 
of the U.S./NATO security guarantees, this debate has proven that remaining interoperable under 
the NATO architecture and utilizing NATO resources as necessary is still Turkey’s most 
efficient policy option, considering the financial and technical challenges of missile defense even 
for the US. 
 
 
Missile Threats to Turkey 
 
Turkey’s calculus on missile threats is based on the wide range of capabilities state and non-state 
actors have in the Middle East, including ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced guided rockets, 
artillery and mortars, anti-ship missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.1  
 
Turkey’s definition of the T-LORAMIDS project as 70% air defense and 30% ballistic missile 
defense reflects Turkey’s perceptions in response to missile capabilities in its neighborhood: The 
system is only intended to address Turkey’s regional competitor’s systems, and not Israeli or 
Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century | Paper 2 2 
Russian missiles. 
 
Regarding Russia, Turkey would not try to or be able to counter its huge nuclear arsenal with a 
national missile defense system. However, it is worth mentioning that Russia deployed SS-26 
Iskander missiles in Gyumri, Armenia, in 2013, threatening eastern provinces of Turkey within 
its 400 km range.2 The Russian nuclear posture, military modernization, and the Ukrainian 
conflict all contribute to Turkey’s increased threat perception.3 Prior to the recent 
rapprochement, the situation was exacerbated by the November 2015 Turkish downing of a 
Russian Su-24 bomber along the Syrian-Turkish border due to airspace violation, and the major 
disagreements in the fight against ISIS and the future of Syria. 
 
While the threat evaluation requires the consideration of both capabilities and intentions, heavy 
involvement of external actors such as Russia and the complexity of regional political relations 
make these “intentions” less predictable. Hence, Turkish decision makers prioritize a capabilities 
approach in their threat calculus, particularly toward Syrian and Iranian missile capabilities. 
 
Syrian Missile Capabilities 
Today, Turkey’s most immediate concerns regarding missile threats originate from both state 
and non-state actors along its Syrian border. 
 
Prior to the civil war, the Syrian regime was capable of producing approximately 30 Scud-B/Cs 
per year but was dependent on foreign assistance, mainly Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, 
for the components and technology.4 The Assad regime has less than 100 road-mobile short-
range ballistic missile (SRBM) launchers and solid-fuel SS-21 SRBMs and M-600 Tishreen 
ballistic missiles, which is the domestic version of the Iranian Fateh-110.5 Syria also possesses 
Russian Yakhont anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and cruise missiles designed for coastal 
defense.6  
 
The Assad regime has three surface-to-surface missile brigades, with a concentration of Scud 
variants at the 4th Armored Division for regime survival.7 The SS-21 (120 km range) and M-600 
(250 km range) can hit Turkish cities near the border.8 With the Scud-C (500-650 km range) and 
Scud-D (600-700 km range), Damascus could deliver both conventional and WMD warheads to 
Turkey’s southeastern cities and critical facilities, while it could reach Ankara from Aleppo.9 
The limited stockpile of the Scud-D variant that Damascus owns is particularly worrisome to 
Turkish decision makers, as the modifications for re-entry and improved range would lead to a 
decrease in payload and make use of WMD warheads more likely, demonstrated by the 2005 
Syria test-fire of 3 Scud-Bs and Scud-Ds at low-altitude airburst mode.10 However, the civil war 
has brought uncertainty to the location and status of the missile arsenal, e.g. 2014 media reports 
that Hezbollah moved long-range Scud-D missiles, Iranian Fateh-110 and Fajr-5 rockets, and the 
Russian ASCM into Lebanon.11 Since the conflict is prolonged, the Assad regime is likely to 
need to “replenish” its missile inventory by transfers from Iran, Russia, or China.12  
 
Throughout the conflict, Turkish cities have been hit by stray artillery shells coming from Syria. 
On March 24, 2015, a Scud variant Fateh-110 missile fired by the Syrian army from the Tartus 
Russian naval base against the rebels exploded in the Reyhanli district of Hatay in Turkey, 
leaving a 15-meter wide crater and injuring five Turkish civilians.13 The area was reported to be 
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outside the radar range of the Patriot batteries, leading to the critiques that the batteries should 
protect the riskiest area, such as Hatay, instead of the Kurecik radar or the U.S. airbase in 
Incirlik.14  
 
ISIS capabilities also threaten Turkey. ISIS fighters have been seen with Chinese-made FN-6 
man-portable air defense systems or shoulder-fired heat-seeking MANDPADS.15 According to 
U.S. intelligence estimates, it is also probable that ISIS fighters acquired the shoulder-fired 
Stinger missiles in Iraq.16 Throughout 2016, ISIS has been hitting Turkish cities, especially Kilis, 
with Katyusha rockets.17 
 
Turkey has also kept a close eye on Russian military buildup in Syria, despite the recent political 
rapprochement. Russia has deployed S-400 air defense systems in northern Syria with ranges 
extending into Turkish airspace. Russia has deployed at least one Iskander missile variant to its 
Humaymim Air Base according to satellite imagery.18 Turkey has also heavily criticized both the 
Assad regime’s and Russia’s continued missile and rocket attacks in rebel-held towns near 
Damascus and Aleppo, and hitting Turkmen villages near Latakia in November 2015 instead of 
ISIS targets.19 In November-December 2015, Russian warships and submarines in the Caspian 
Fleet and Mediterranean Sea launched sea-based Kalibr cruise missiles, the first use of the 3M-
14 submarine variant, at ISIS targets in Syria, despite the incidents of deviation in flight path that 
crashed the cruise missiles in Iran and the Arctic.20  
 
Iran’s Missile Capabilities 
While Iran’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) deal with P5+1 has alleviated the 
international community’s concerns with the Iranian nuclear program, Iran still has the largest 
and most diverse range of missile capabilities in the Middle East that can virtually target any 
critical asset in Turkey, including Istanbul, Ankara, U.S. and NATO bases. These capabilities 
include short-range artillery rockets, which can be used in irregular warfare, transferred to non-
state or proxy actors such as Hezbollah, and have strategic impact to support ground forces 
without close air support.21 
 
The main missile threats from Iran to Turkey are Iran’s SRBMSs and medium-range ballistic 
missiles (MRBMs). Iran has around 100 SRBM launchers that can be reloaded and fewer than 50 
silo and mobile MRBM launchers.22 The Iranian inventory of short-range missiles includes the 
Zelzal family (150-250 km), Fateh-110 (200-300 km), the Scud-B based Shahab-1 (350 km), 
Scud-C based Shahab-2 (750 km) and its upgrade Qiam-1 (700-800 km).23 Iran’s tactical ballistic 
missiles could be effective in an engagement with Turkish land forces close to the border, but the 
launches in salvos would be convenient targets for the Turkish Air Force.24  
 
In the medium to longer range, the Iranian inventory includes the modifications of the North 
Korean No Dong missiles, namely the silo-based and road-mobile Shahab-3 (around 1300 km), 
the flight tests of its modification, which is a longer range Ghadir-1 (around 1600 km, also 
referred to as Kavoshgar or Shahab-3M), and the solid-propellant two-stage Sajjill-2, or Ashura 
that may deliver a 750 kg warhead to a range of about 2000 km.25 Developmental systems 
include the Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 (3000-5000 km).26 By the 2020s, Tehran could have the 
capability to relocate the road-mobile Sajjill-2 for preventive targeting and its reduced launch-
cycle would undermine early-warning measures.27  
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Iran is estimated to have 50 operational Shahab-3 launchers.28 Iran also reverse engineered and 
manufactured copies of the Chinese C-801 and C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles which has led to 
concerns that it could convert the HY-2 Silkworm ASCMs into longer-range land attack 
systems.29 As the threat of land-attack cruise missiles is on the rise, Turkey cannot defend 
against the Iranian cruise missiles without a more sophisticated system with airborne sensors. In 
March 2015, there were media reports that Iran domestically produced the long-range land-attack 
cruise missile dubbed Soumar, based on the Russian Kh-55 with a 2000 km range.30  
 
Iran conducts regular flight tests and exercises to demonstrate its missile capabilities. In July 
2011, Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) conducted a ten-day live-fire missile exercise 
dubbed “Great Prophet 6,” showcasing the solid-fuel Fateh-110, the Tondar, and Khalije Fars 
anti-ship ballistic missile, as well as the liquid-fuel Shahab-3.31 Iran successfully launched a 
liquid-propellant, two-stage Safir space launch vehicle that can be used as an intermediate-range 
ballistic missile, in addition to plans for a larger vehicle called Simorgh.32 During the February 
2015 “Great Prophet 9” exercise, the naval wing of the IRGC implied that Iran had launched a 
missile from a submerged submarine.33 In August 2015, Iran unveiled Fateh-330, the upgraded, 
500 km version of the Fateh-110.34 Following the formal adoption of the nuclear deal with P5+1 
in October 2015, Iran test-fired a new, precision-guided ballistic missile dubbed Emad, leading 
to U.S. concern of violation of UNSCR 1929 and the nuclear deal.35 While the US was expecting 
that Iran would be launching a Simorgh space rocket into orbit, in March 2016, Iran test-fired 
two missiles that were thought to be the Qiam-1 and Shahab-1.36   
 
There are also technical limitations to Iran’s missile capabilities. Sankaran argues that Iranian 
missile capabilities are very speculative, as Iran has been alleged to “mislead and misinform” 
regarding their missile and space launch tests to “bluster.”37 The systems lack advanced precision 
guidance and accuracy in GPS.38 Elleman argues that the successful destruction of a fixed 
military target would require Iran to utilize a significant portion of its missile inventory.39 He 
interprets this problem as an indicator that Iran’s priority is enhancing accuracy and lethality 
over longer range.40 There is near consensus among missile experts that resolving these technical 
issues in the short-term requires direct foreign assistance and the sources are well-known.41 
 
While Turkey and Iran have historically had “neighborly” relations, prior to the JCPOA, Iran 
threatened to hit the Kurecik radar as a response to Turkish help to the “Zionist” regime.42 In 
Iranian Brigadier General Hacizade’s words: “If there is an attack on Iran, our first target will be 
the missile shield systems in Turkey, and then we’ll turn to other targets.”43 While Turkey 
welcomes the JCPOA, a major consideration is the exclusion of ballistic missiles from the 
nuclear deal. The sanctions on the Iranian ballistic missile program are expected to be lifted 
within the next 8 years. However, the latest Iranian fire tests have led to new U.S. sanctions on 
the country’s ballistic missile program.   
 
 
Turkey’s Role in the EPAA 
 
Turkey’s direct role in the EPAA began in the completed Phase I by hosting the X-band early-
warning radar in Kurecik, which is responsible for detecting the launch of a ballistic missile from 
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the Middle East and transferring the information to the U.S. SM-3 interceptors to hit the missile 
mid-flight. In addition, Turkey’s military electronics manufacturer ASELSAN provides system 
engineering to improve NATO ballistic missile defense and contributes to air defense projects in 
Poland and Romania.44 
 
The main concerns that Turkey initially had with hosting the radar were naming Iran as a threat, 
the U.S. command and control not allowing any Turkish influence, whether the missile shield 
would cover all of Turkey, and data sharing with non-NATO countries, Israel in particular.45 
However, Kibaroglu argues that the degree of divergence between Turkey and NATO was not as 
wide as it was reflected in the media coverage.46 Turkish authorities considered the radar as a 
sophisticated NATO defense capability that would be a strategic asset for Turkey’s protection 
against “actual and potential” threats from its neighborhood.47 They also perceive being one of 
the few host countries in EPAA as a privilege.48 However, the future role of Turkey within the 
missile defense system is uncertain.  
 
For robust defense, forward-based large radars in proximity to the origin of the missile are 
required, as the sea-based and land-based interceptors launch 100 seconds after the ballistic 
missile detection by the sensors.49 The X-radar is the first chain loop in the system to transfer 
information to the interceptors, and has to be located at an optimum distance from the target. 
Proximity of Kurecik to the Middle East provides an advantage to the NATO system in 
providing cuing information. Establishing each radar system costs approximately $200 million to 
the US.50 The radar is exclusively operated by U.S. personnel, and has a twin system at the 
Nevatim Air Force Base in the Negev desert in Israel.51 The U.S. Army allocates roughly $21 
million per year for the Kurecik radar.52  
 
While the US is likely to continue to host the radar due to its location, beyond the Turkish 
domestic concerns about sharing information with Israel, there are also critiques of the adequacy 
of the radar: According to the U.S. Defense Science Board, the TPY-2 land-based radar’s 
tracking range is not adequate for a robust defense of Alliance territory and increase in 
sensitivity is required, as well as extremely high speed data sharing among multiple sensors in 
effective discrimination.53 Authors argue that the AN/TPY-2 radar system was chosen in part 
because it has limited ability to see into the Russian airspace.54 
 
Following the airspace conflicts between Turkey and Russia in Northern Syria, in December 
2015, the NATO foreign ministers agreed on a Turkish air defense package to enhance air and 
naval presence, including maritime patrol aircraft, and an AWACS platform in the eastern 
Mediterranean provided by German and Danish ships.55 The new NATO missile defense 
architecture is expected to include an extra deployment of Italian SAMP/T in Turkey and an 
Arleigh Burke-class U.S. ship to be deployed in the Black Sea on a constant basis.56 While 
NATO underlines its commitment to Turkish security by readily-deployable forces, there is 
disagreement between Turkey and NATO on the types of threats and priorities, such as PKK 
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Currently, Aselsan, the Turkish military electronics producer, and the national missile 
manufacturer Roketsan have designed low- and mid-altitude air defense systems worth 
approximately 200 million Euros and 130 million Euros respectively.57 Hisar-A is designed to 
address short-range threats for the protection of land units, and Hisar-O is designed for the 
medium-range, for the protection of larger units such as air defense batteries.58 According to 
Roketsan officials, Hisar systems have a dual pulse (or stage), solid-propellant rocket engine (the 
timing for the firing of the second stroke is optimized into the guidance algorithm, creating a 
surprise element and uncertainty in maneuvers).59  
 
Meanwhile, Turkey plans to carry its offensive, defensive, reconnaissance, surveillance, and 
early-warning resources and capabilities into space within the next ten years.60 The Turkish Air 
Force is establishing a Space Group Command, an aerospace force unit that will specialize in 
satellite launches, reconnaissance space-based imagery, early warning, satellites, and satellite 
communications.61 The early concept design of a proposed space launch vehicle (SLV) has been 
commissioned to Roketsan. Turkey plans to invest $100 million to develop the SLV, dubbed the 
Turkish Satellite Launching System (UFS). SSM also has a vision to complete the radar 
requirements of the long-range, high-altitude air and missile defense systems, including an early 
warning radar and the “CAFRAD” Multifunction Phased Array Radar System, within the next 
four years.62 
 
On long range BMD, after years of contention, in November 2015, Turkey entirely dropped the 
tentative agreement with China’s CPMIEC for T-LORAMIDS based on technology transfer 
concerns.63 Since then, Turkish officials began to argue for an off-the-shelf “stopgap” acquisition 
until Turkey develops an indigenous system.64  
 
As the lead U.S. negotiator for missile defense basing agreements in Turkey, Romania, and 
Poland, Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose, states, NATO encourages the allies to develop 
and contribute their own national capabilities, including early-warning missile defense capable 
radars, in addition to basing support.65 However, the key to missile defense cooperation is 
interoperability to complement and supplement layered systems, as seen in Israel’s David’s 
Sling, Iron Dome, and Arrow systems. At this point, Turkey faces some strategic choices.  
NATO’s electronic warfare security codes require interoperability of the systems that will be 
plugged onto NATO systems, unless it is a “stand-alone” system. By purchasing U.S. or 
European systems, Turkey would benefit from an expanded NATO capability in the Eastern 
Mediterranean through the integration of a national Turkish system with the EPAA 
architecture.66  
 
Proponents of a stand-alone system or a possible non-NATO system argue that Turkey’s pursuit 
of air and missile defense technology is not a challenge against NATO. Regarding the China 
deal, Defense Minister Yilmaz had initially argued that the missile defense system would be only 
integrated to the national systems for Turkey’s defense without being integrated to NATO.67 
However, not integrating the national missile defense system to the NATO grid would only 
reduce efficiency and prevent the full coverage of threats to intercept ballistic missiles.68 
Meanwhile, high ranking defense procurement officials insisted that Turkey could address the 
concerns regarding information sharing between non-NATO and NATO systems by an 
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interphase filter produced by the Turkish AYESAS that provides one-sided information.69 A 
view widely unpopular among NATO officials, Turkey seems to have cancelled the initial plans 
but has not entirely ruled out the possibility.  
 
One of the off-the-shelf systems that is currently being considered is the “Medium Extended Air 
Defense System”- MEADS, jointly developed by the US, Germany, and Italy.70 The system uses 
a phase-array radar that provides 360-degree coverage that appeals to the Turkish decision 
makers.71 While this system was initially intended to replace the Patriot systems, the US decided 
to discontinue funding the program, and Germany has not finalized the agreement with Europe’s 
MBDA and Lockheed Martin Corp that they will fund the procurement of the system.72 The 




Turkey’s Roadblocks to an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Architecture 
 
Turkish decision makers face technical challenges that lead to gaps in coverage in the EPAA 
architecture, procurement challenges originating from the AKP government’s insistence on not 
purchasing an off-the-shelf system, and political implications on Turkey’s commitment to NATO 
in the midst of the crisis in Syria and Iraq, as well as Turkey’s military restructuring after the 
July 15th failed coup attempt.  
 
Technical challenges with EPAA 
There has been little debate in Turkey on the technical limitations and vulnerabilities of EPAA 
systems, such as intercepting countermeasures and decoys, lack of realistic battlefield tests, and 
inability to intercept low-flying cruise missiles. Instead, the discussion has focused on whether 
the EPAA can address Turkey’s security needs from purely a geographical coverage perspective. 
Ankara has been negotiating concrete security guarantees that all of Turkish territory will be 
protected by the EPAA plan. This idea was explored as an option to have 10 SM-3 Block IIA 
land-based interceptors at the Incirlik Air Base and Ramstein Air Base in Germany each.73 
However, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) plan to choose Romania and Poland 
instead left parts of Turkey uncovered, unless additional resources, such as the Terminal High-
Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) system, were added to expand coverage and area 
defense.  
 
According to Phase II of EPAA, THAAD can be introduced as “potential surge” for enhanced 
medium-range missile defense for areas out of coverage.74 However, as the U.S. has more critical 
strategic assets such as military bases in the Arab Gulf countries, and can protect Incirlik Air 
Base from the sea, it is unlikely that a THAAD system would be permanently stationed in 
eastern Turkey.75  
 
Due to the trajectory of ballistic missiles and Turkey’s geographical proximity to the region, the 
existing architecture doesn’t provide defense over the entirety Turkish territory.76 The SM-3 
interceptor engages the target midcourse and therefore cannot engage the missile while it is in 
eastern Turkey during its ascent phase.77  
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To demonstrate this selective coverage issue, Sankaran simulates an Iranian missile attack with 
current capabilities on two U.S. bases in Turkey. First is the Incirlik Air Base at a 964-km 
distance to the launch site of a Shahab-3 in Tabriz, reached by the EPAA SM-3 IB interceptors 
(3.5 km/s burnout velocity) launched from the Eastern Mediterranean Sea with a time delay of 
100 seconds needed for tracking the target missile and pinpointing the location for intercept.78 
Second is NATO’s Izmir Air Base at a 16700-km distance from Tabriz, reached by the EPAA 
SM-3 IB interceptors launched from Deveselu, Romania with 100 seconds delay.79 Sankaran 
concludes that, in both cases, assuming perfect information, minimum energy trajectory, and no 
countermeasures, intercept is kinematically possible.80 Meanwhile, an EPAA SM-3 IB 
interceptor launched from Deveselu would not be able to defend against the missile attack on 
Incirlik Air Base, even with no time delay, whereas an Aegis ship in the Eastern Mediterranean 
would reach the Shahab-3 targeting Izmir Air Base with 100 seconds delay.81  
 
Procurement Issues and Financing 
Turkey’s policy objectives in national air and missile defense acquisition are strengthening the 
domestic defense industry through international partnerships in technology transfer and military 
modernization. Hence, the Turkish government set the selection criteria as the possibility of 
coproduction, cost, and delivery date, instead of the technical specifications and track record of 
the systems in effectively addressing the range of air and missile threats, and the political 
implications of the decision. It is also crucial to note that the Turkish Defense Ministry 
prioritizes cost and technology transfer, while the Turkish Air Force demands to acquire the most 
advanced systems, heavily influenced by NATO. Meanwhile, the discrepancy between Turkey’s 
national defense objectives and the $15 billion annual defense spending motivates Turkish 
policymakers to prioritize costs in decision making. 
 
Turkish security policy makers argue that Turkey remains dependent on the system providers as 
long as it doesn’t co-develop the technology. “If Turkey opts for direct purchase of the system 
then it will be obliged to make new off-the-shelf purchases 15 or 20 years later. We will not 
settle for this. Our target is to gain national technological capability in the missile project,” stated 
Ismail Demir, the Undersecretary of Defense Industries (SSM).82 According to a Roketsan 
official, the measures that technology-providing countries impose to protect their competitive 
advantage requires Turkey to eventually develop the technology themselves beyond transfer 
agreements in the procurement plan.83 However, they realize that Turkey’s national solutions 
might bring lower performance, longer production times, and higher costs. 
 
Political Considerations and Lessons Learned from T-LORAMIDS 
Turkey considers lack of air and missile defense systems as a strategic weakness that left Turkish 
security policies dependent on the U.S. and allies’ guarantees in every crisis. Turkey faced 
political hesitation leading to delay in the decision to send NATO systems, leading to loss of 
trust.84 If NATO provides the systems to Turkey, there is concern in Ankara that there can be 
“strings attached,” leading to the independence argument.85  
 
According to Turkish decision makers, since Turkey cannot rely solely on the NATO alliance for 
its security needs, it is rational to develop indigenous capabilities.86 L. Gen. Salih Ulusoy, former 
president of Turkish General Staff planning and principles, states that off-the-shelf systems can 
no longer be the only option for Turkey, but this effort toward independence should not be 
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interpreted as a threat to the U.S. defense industry, but as Turkey becoming a stable partner in 
the Middle East to cooperate more with.87  
 
However, Turkey’s quest for independence has not necessarily been welcome by its NATO 
partners, interpreted as a shift in Turkey’s strategic orientation away from the Alliance. While 
aiming to bargain for strategic advantage, Turkey almost made a decision to choose a system that 
would not be interoperable with NATO assets. In addition, the US was particularly concerned 
with the choice of the Chinese company. CPMIEC has been listed under a number of 
nonproliferation sanctions by the United States. Had Turkey proceeded with the Chinese offer, 
missile defense would have had broader strategic consequences on U.S.-Turkish relations.  
 
Turkey’s domestic constraints 
Following the July 15th failed coup attempt, Turkey has internal security concerns that 
complicate the decisions regarding its defense spending and priorities. In addition to the massive 
restructuring in its state bureaucracy and the armed forces, Turkey has gone back to conducting 
military operations in its counterinsurgency efforts against PKK, despite the ineffectiveness of 
air strikes. and joined anti-ISIS coalition operations. Major Turkish cities have also been targeted 
by ISIS. In addition to the high costs of the war against terror, Turkish economy no longer enjoys 
the high growth rate it had during the 2000s and has reached a plateau. Moreover, Turkey has 
spent $10 million for approximately 3 million registered Syrian refugees in Turkey. Despite the 
financial aid agreement with the Germany for 3 million Euros, the future costs of hosting these 
refugees remain to be seen.  
 
President Erdogan’s quest for consolidation of power under an executive presidency through 
constitutional reform and the great purge in state apparatus following the coup attempt lead to 
concerns of increased authoritarianism, contributing to Turkey’s never-ending democracy issues. 
This domestic struggle has dire implications on Turkey’s regional and transatlantic relations, 
generating concern about Turkey’s strategic orientation.  
 
 
Lessons from the EPAA 
 
The main lesson for Turkey from the EPAA experience is how establishing a missile shield is 
technically, financially, and politically very challenging, even for the US and NATO.  
Technical challenges include but are not limited to low bandwidth of early warning radars, 
leading to discrimination problems against countermeasures and decoys, limited time for 
interception, need for continuous coverage, costs and lack of realistic operational conditions for 
flight testing, and the offense-defense cost curve being in favor of offensive missiles.  
Financially, each test costs approximately $400 million and generates terabytes of data to be 
analyzed, leading to one test on average per year.88 In adjusted terms, the U.S. appropriations 
since 1996 on missile defense add up to $274 billion.89 Since 2006, 150 to 250 million Euros 
(approximately $321 million) have been spent on theater missile defense, and additional 850 
million euros will be needed to expand the system in the next decade.90 European allies plan to 
contribute more than $1 billion to develop the missile shield.91 
 
Finally, BMD has strategic implications on Turkey’s political relationships with its neighbors. 
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As seen in EPAA’s impact on Russian and Chinese threat perceptions, an increased BMD 
capability is likely to trigger political reaction from countries such as Russia and Iran. Turkish 
BMD capability could also lead to missile and countermeasures proliferation in the region in the 
shorter range.  
 
 
The U.S. Role in Turkey’s Air and Missile Defense 
 
While the United States is working toward a region-wide ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
capability extending from Europe to the Persian Gulf, one of its key allies, Turkey, is questioning 
its role in the EPAA architecture and pursuing national air and missile defense. At the heart of 
the disagreements between the United States and Turkey are Turkey’s historic concerns about 
the U.S. commitment to Turkish security, given political disagreements and divergences of 
security interests, as well as the “bureaucratic red tape” leading to significant delays in defense 
cooperation agreements.  
 
In August 2015, the German and U.S. governments announced that the Patriot batteries and 
soldiers deployed in Turkey would not be renewed by the end of their mandate in 2016.92 
Meanwhile Spain continues to provide a BMD capability with a PAC-2 unit consisting of six 
launchers of four missiles near the Adana airport. The joint Turkish-U.S. statement underlined 
the U.S. commitment to support Turkish air and missile defense, and the need for “critical 
modernization upgrades” to the Patriot assets, prepared to return “within one week if needed.”93 
 
The U.S. withdrawal of the Patriot batteries deployed at the Gaziantep 5th Armored Brigade 
Command began in early October 2015.94 In order to prove their commitment to military 
coordination against the instability in the Middle East and increased Russian military buildup in 
the region, the U.S. and Turkish Naval Forces held a joint training exercise called the “Eastern 
Mediterranean Sea Exercise” in November 2015, including the BMD-equipped USS Donald 
Cook, submarines, surface and air defense units.95 In addition, the U.S. Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) approved a $70 million sale of Joint Direct Attack Munitions 
(JDAM) to Turkey to be used on guidance kits and hard target penetrator warheads.96  
 
Aiming to strengthen the defense of Turkey’s airspace against non-NATO forces, in November 
2015, the US deployed six F-15C air-to-air combat aircraft to Incirlik Air Base to join other U.S. 
aerial assets, including A-10 attack aircraft deployed at the base to fight against ISIS.97 While 
these deployments were temporary and were withdrawn in December 2015, the U.S. intention is 
to demonstrate to Turkish officials that their requests for air-to-air support can be fulfilled on 
short notice. 
 
Given the evolution of the conflicts in Syria and unstable relations with Russia, Turkey’s 
demands for U.S. security guarantees have become broader than missile defense and the EPAA 
architecture. One of the main points of contention between Turkish and American officials is 
barriers to defense exports such as classification of sensitive materials and technology, delays in 
licensing, and controlling commercial components as military items. Turkish officials argue that 
these difficulties function as an “embargo,” and lead to expensive and low-performing 
products.98  
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U.S. defense officials argue that there is an interagency process to develop a more flexible 
licensing mechanism for strategic trade authorization of close allies.99 They add that it is the U.S. 
strategic interest to reduce the complexities and impediments to sharing technology with Turkey, 
as its defense sector is growing and becoming more sophisticated.100 However, the Turkish 
defense authorities find this approach unconvincing due to the administrative delays that have a 
detrimental impact on Turkish security.101 Hence, a major issue to be considered in future rounds 
of strategic dialogue is how U.S. allies such as Turkey perceive missile defense as an instrument 
in the larger strategic relationship and could be given security reassurances in alternative terms 
tailor-made to their security needs.  
 
 
Consequences of a Reduced U.S. Role on NATO Missile Defense 
 
A reduced U.S. role on NATO missile defense is likely to trigger Turkey’s historical concerns 
with respect to reliance on NATO guarantees, due to the technical and political implications of 
such a decision. Without U.S. platforms, early warning radars and Aegis ships in particular, 
neither Turkey nor its European allies are likely to succeed in the integration of layered BMD 
systems and proper testing. These countries would not be able to carry the technological and 
financial burden of EPAA without U.S. support.  
 
In terms of the political relationship, a U.S. reduction in support for European missile defense 
would deteriorate the already stressed Turkey-US relations as a signal of abandonment. In such a 
scenario, Turkish authorities might go back to exploring non-NATO options for stopgap and 
technology transfer, which would have a detrimental impact on the U.S.-Turkish strategic 





The national air and missile defense debate in Turkey reflects a larger independence and military 
modernization trend. The “equal partner” principle—that Turkey should utilize its national 
capacities and be a partner, not only a market for international defense projects—is 
unequivocally reflected in the guiding principles for national air and missile defense 
procurement. However, given the technical differences between low- and medium-altitude air 
defense systems and long-range ballistic missile defense systems, it is a technological leap for 
the Turkish defense industry. Since Turkey is years away from achieving indigenous capability, 
it should continue to rely on NATO force generation as needed and maintain a coherent NATO 
strategy that involves missile defense, instead of independence from the Alliance.     
 
As seen by the progression of the missile defense deal with China, sudden deterioration of 
relations with Russia, and continued lack of progress in Russia-NATO relations, it is clear that 
Turkey’s resources and current capabilities are inadequate to address its security concerns 
outside a NATO architecture. In making future procurement decisions, Turkish decision makers 
should carefully consider not only the financial and technical limitations of missile defense, but 
also the political implications, to maintain interoperability with NATO. By doing so, Turkey 
benefits from NATO information sharing, early warning and tracking data from radars, and 
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intelligence. NATO pays for the costs of installing, operating, and maintaining expensive 
systems. Turkey benefits from layered NATO platforms, i.e. Aegis ships in the Mediterranean 
and the Black Sea, Aegis Ashore, THAAD if needed, PAC-3, and interoperability with the U.S. 
C2BMC (command and control, battle management, and communications system) and 
Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP).   
 
While the future of the EPAA architecture remains to be seen under the new U.S. presidency, 
considering missile defense as a component of NATO deterrence under U.S. guarantees is a less 
risky decision for Turkish policymakers than investing in disconnected, ineffective platforms of 
their own.  
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Timeline 
1991: After NATO’s slow response to Ankara’s request for air defense reinforcements during the 
Gulf War, Turkish Armed Forces create the Air Defense Master Plan to prioritize the acquisition 
of low-altitude air defense systems. 
1997: Turkey begins negotiations with Israel for the co-production of the Arrow air and missile 
defense system. (The deal fails in 2001 due to the financial crisis in Turkey.)  
March 2002: The Turkish Air Force announces the “Aerospace and Missile Defense Concept,” 
assigning the missile defense command to the Turkish Air Force. 
February 2003: France, Germany, and Belgium block the deployment of NATO equipment to 
Turkey, including Patriot missile batteries and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 
surveillance planes prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. U.S. and Dutch batteries are deployed 
instead.  
April 2009: The Turkish Undersecretariat for the Defense Industry (SSM) issues a proposal for 
the purchase of a long-range air and missile defense system (T-LORAMIDS), and the following 
companies file bids for the $4 billion tender: 
- U.S. Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, PAC-3s  
- Russian Rosoboronexport, S-300, 
- China Precision Machinery Export Import Corp (CPMIEC), FD-2000 (export version of 
HQ-9)  
- Italian-French joint venture Eurosam, the SAMP/T Aster 30. 	
September 2009: The Obama administration notifies Congress of a potential $7.8 billion sale to 
Turkey, including 13 Patriot fire units, 72 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missiles, 197 
MIM-104E Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM-T) and 4 validation missiles, and 
hardware for ground-based air defense. 
September 2011: Turkey agrees to host the U.S. Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance 
(AN/TPY-2) early-warning radar system in Kurecik, Malatya.  
September 2013: Turkey selects China’s CPMIEC for T-LORAMIDS.  
February 2013: Following the June 2012 shooting of a Turkish reconnaissance jet by Syrian 
forces and shells killing Turkish civilians in Akcakale, NATO’s “Active Fence” mission begins 
in southeast Turkey. The United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and later Spain provide 
Patriot missiles for protection of the Turkish-Syrian border.  
August 2014: Combat Air Force and Air-Missile Defense Command is established in Eskisehir, 
responsible for missile defense control, strategic air assets, intelligence, and space activities 
under one C2. 
January 2015: Turkey extends the deadline for T-LORAMIDS bids for the sixth time to open 
parallel talks with Eurosam and Raytheon/Lockheed Martin.  
March 2015: The Turkish military’s electronics manufacturer ASELSAN launches a Radar and 
Electronic Warfare Technology Center in Ankara.  
 
Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century | Paper 2 14 
May 2015: Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) establishes a Spacecraft Assembly, Integration, 
and Test Center in Ankara.  
November 2015: Turkey cancels the long-range air and missile defense system tender.  
December 2015: The United States and Germany withdraw their Patriot batteries and soldiers 
from Turkey, while Spain decides to extend its participation in the “Active Fence” mission until 
December 2016.  
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The Tactical Utility and Strategic Effects of the Emerging Asian Phased Adaptive 
Approach Missile Defense System 




The United States and Japan are jointly developing and deploying an integrated advanced regional missile 
defense system meant to counter threats from North Korea. North Korea possesses a large and diversified 
arsenal of short- and medium-range missiles that could strike Japanese cities and military bases in the event 
of a crisis and cause measurable damage. The missile defense system currently in place provides strong 
kinematic defensive coverage over Japanese territory. However, in general, the offense enjoys a strong cost 
advantage. It is impractical to deploy as many defensive interceptors as there are offensive missiles, which, 
in turn, limits the efficiency of missile defenses. It should be understood that regional missile defenses in the 
Asia-Pacific are neither capable nor expected to provide 100% defense. Rather, their goal is to provide 
sufficient capability to bolster deterrence and, should deterrence fail, to provide enough defense in the initial 
stages of a crisis to protect vital military assets. Additionally, U.S. and Japanese forces apparently also need 
to develop a better command and control architecture to operate the Asia-Pacific regional missile defense 
system. Finally, while the system is meant to defend only against regional threats, China has argued that the 
system might in the future be able to intercept Chinese ICBMs, thereby diluting its strategic deterrent against 
the United States. Maintaining effective defenses against North Korea while reassuring China will be one of 





Japan has invested significant resources into its missile defense plans. Its decision to pursue 
missile defense could be categorized as either a “threat-driven approach” meant to defend against 
missiles that North Korea (or China) might launch against it or as a “structure-driven approach” 
meant to revamp and strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance and its military interoperability.1 It is 
very difficult to parse and separate these two motives. In the last decade or so, however, the 
“threat” factor from North Korea seems to be the primary driver for Japanese choices. For 
example, in March 2016, the Japanese Defense Ministry announced that its “ground-based 
missile interception system [Patriot Advanced Capability-3] would be permanently deployed at a 
location in Tokyo following the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s increasingly frequent 
launches of ballistic missiles.”2 Table 1 below summarizes a timeline of major events that have 
occurred in the course Japan’s pursuit of missile defenses. 
 
The first major realization of a potential missile threat to the Japanese homeland occurred in 
August 1998, when North Korea flight-tested its Taepodong missile. The “Taepodong shock” 
changed the cautious attitude on missile defense that Japan had previously held. The incident 
measurably “altered the Japanese public’s threat perception vis-à-vis Pyongyang, particularly 
because the missile flew over the Japanese mainland.”3 The 1998 North Korean missile test also 
“consolidated a large political support [leading to the passing of the U.S.-Japan Defense 
Guidelines legislation] not only allowing the government to officially launch a TMD [theater 
missile defense] co-research [project] with the U.S. but also to introduce domestically-produced 
reconnaissance satellites.”4 This reaction from Japanese politicians to the 1998 incident appears 
to have surprised even the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) officers. Some of 
them had observed that “Such quick political decisions would have been virtually impossible had 
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the Taepodong incident not taken place—we are even ‘grateful’ to Pyongyang for ‘helping’ our 
cause to move on ahead with missile defense.”5  
 
Over the years, North Korea has conducted many test launches of its missile and satellite launch 
vehicles and has not shied from issuing threats towards Japan. In 2013, for example, the Korean 
Central News Agency (KCNA) of North Korea issued a commentary that said: “Japan is always 
in the cross-hairs of our revolutionary army and if Japan makes the slightest move, the spark of 
war will touch Japan first.”6 North Korea has approximately 1,000 missiles capable of reaching 
regional targets.7 The most numerous missiles are the various SCUDs that can target South 
Korea. From the Japanese perspective, the Nodong missiles with their 1,500 km range are the 
most worrisome. North Korea also seems to possess a limited number of the Musudan missile 
with a range of 3,500 km which puts all of Northeast Asia and Guam and Okinawa under threat.  
 
It should also be noted that North Korea could have as many as 20 nuclear weapons by the end 
of 2016, according to some analysts.8 North Korean motives for procuring a missile arsenal is 
usually attributed to two reasons: “first is to compel the United States to alter its strategic 
calculus so that it is willing to accept a political settlement on the Korean peninsula conducive to 
regime interests…second is to be prepared to defend its interests in case of renewed military 
action on the peninsula, including ensuring survival of the regime.”9  
 
The first section of this paper will examine the status of the North Korean missile arsenal and its 
potential to threaten forward-deployed U.S., Japanese, and other allied forces. The second 
section of this paper will assess the state of readiness of the Asian Phased Adaptive Approach 
(APAA) missile defense system that Japan and the U.S. are establishing and its ability to offer 
limited defense against North Korean missiles. The section will also highlight the various 
command and control (C2) challenges the APAA missile defense system has faced until now. 
The third section will examine potential obstacles to the APAA, including Chinese concerns 
regarding the program. The final section will conclude with a recommendation on managing the 




September 1986 Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoba 
issues public statement on Japan’s 
participation in SDI 
1989 U.S. DoD/SDIO initiates WESTPAC Study. 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries wins contract to 
lead study 
1991 Japan decides to acquire PAC-2 systems. 
Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces began 
receiving these PAC-2 systems in 1998. 
1993 North Korea fires four short-range missiles 
into the Sea of Japan 
October 1993 SecDef Les Aspin offers Japan formal 
participation in TMD 
December 1993 U.S.-Japan bilateral Theater Missile Defense 
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Working Group (TMDWG) formed. 
TDMWG is seen as the foundation work that 
has now led to the joint development of SM-3 
IIA 
1995 Japanese government sets aside 20 million 
yen for TMD research. The Office of Ballistic 
Missile Defense Research (BMDR) 
established in the Japanese Defense Agency 
(JDA). 
March 1996 China fires four DF-15 missiles in the vicinity 
of Taiwan 
August 31, 1998 North Korea launches a Taepodong missile 
that flies over Japanese mainland 
September 1998 Both Houses of Japan’s Diet passes an 
unanimous resolution condemning North 
Korean missile launch and urges Japan to 
explore all means to secure the safety of the 
population. 
August 16, 1999 U.S. and Japan sign MOU on joint R&D of 
SM-3 IIA missiles 
2003 Japan decided to deploy the SM-3 Block IA 
on-board its Aegis-equipped ships.  
December 19, 2003 Japan announces decision to deploy a missile 
defense system by acquiring PAC-3 and 
Aegis SM-3 IA 
May 2006 The United States deploys a forward-based X-
band radar at the JASDF’s Shariki Garrison  
2007 First battery of PAC-3 interceptors deployed 
to Iruma Air Base 
2010 Japan decides to increase the number of 
Aegis-equipped BMD ships to six 
December 2014 Second U.S. X-band radar deployed to 
Kyogamisaki 
March 2016 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 to be 
permanently deployed in Tokyo 
Table 1: Timeline on Japanese Missile Defense10 
 
 
North Korea’s Missile Arsenal and the Threat to Japan 
 
Pyongyang’s missile arsenal has progressively grown in both quantity and quality. In the 2000s, 
it was believed that North Korea had several hundred of missiles capable of reaching a wide 
range of locations in the Asia-Pacific.11 In 2002, General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander of 
United States Forces Korea testified before the U.S. Congress that North Korea had over 500 
SCUD missile variants.12 A 2009 report by the International Crisis Group suggested that North 
Korea had deployed over 600 SCUDs and around 320 Nodong missiles.13 The 2010 United 
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States Forces Korea Strategic Digest states that North Korea, “with as many as 800 missiles in 
its active inventory…intends to increase its offensive capabilities.”14 Finally, very recent 
estimates by the U.S. Air Force have suggested that North Korea could have a total 1,000 
missiles with around 100 SCUD launchers and 50 Nodong launchers.15 While it is very difficult 
to obtain an accurate count of North Korean missiles, it is, however, possible to develop a rough 
estimate based on various publicly available sources. Table 2 below summarizes an estimate of 
the North Korean missile inventory collated from multiple sources.16 It is should be noted that 
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Table 2: North Korean Missile Specifications17 
 
While North Korea has an ambitious missile development program, its various missile 
capabilities are not equal. For example, its ability to successfully use an intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM) or even an intermediate-range ballistic missile (range between 3,000 and 5,500 
kilometers) is highly questionable, although recent successful space launches revive such 
concerns.18 The 2013 U.S. Defense Department Annual Report on North Korea, for example, 
states: “…they [North Korea] unveiled an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and a 
version of the NoDong medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) fitted with a cone-cylinder-flare 
payload at parades during the last three years. To date, the IRBM, like the new mobile ICBM, 
has not been flight-tested and its current reliability as a weapon system would be low.” The 
report also says: “…a space launch does not test a reentry vehicle (RV). Without an RV capable 
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However, North Korea’s shorter range missiles, including various types of SCUDs and some 
Nodong missiles are more tested and presumed to have a higher likelihood of operational 
effectiveness. Figure 1 below shows the reach of these shorter range missiles. One of the largest 
worries for the U.S.-Japan-South Korean alliance is the concerns regarding the North’s potential 
ability to use these missiles coupled with a nuclear weapon. The South Korean 2014 Defense 
White Paper, for example, speculates that “North Korea possesses about 40 kg of plutonium that 
can be used to produce nuclear weapons and it also assessed that a highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) program is underway. North Korea’s ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons also seems to 
hav e reached a considerable level.”20 North Korea is also feared to have an arsenal of biological 
and chemical weaponry that could be delivered using its missiles. Its chemical weapons stockpile 
was estimated in 2005 to be between 2,500 and 5,000 tons.21 Finally, even with mildly inaccurate 
conventional warheads, North Korean missiles could, in principle, substantially disrupt U.S. and 
allied military operations and impede logistics at U.S. bases in the region. 
       
 
Figure 1: Notional Range of North Korean Missiles 
Source: Author's Calculations 
 
 
Japan’s Missile Defense Capacity and Capabilities 
 
While a large proportion of Japanese missile defense infrastructure is relatively new, Japan has 
been involved in missile defense related research and development since the mid-1980s. Under a 
1985 licensing agreement with the United States, Japan produced Patriot missiles.22 In 1998, the 
Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces (JASDF) received a total of 24 Patriot Advanced Capability-2 
(PAC-2) batteries. In 1999, Japan decided to upgrade to the PAC-3 missile defense system at a 
cost of $1.7-$2.3 billion.23 In 2007, the first battery of PAC-3 interceptors was deployed to Iruma 
Air Base near Tokyo.24 The JASDF now possesses a total of 16 PAC-3 fire units located at Naha, 
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Kasuga, Gifu, and Iruma.25 It should be noted that these PAC-3 batteries provide only terminal 
defense with very limited coverage. 
 
A national missile defense shield for Japan is provided by its Aegis-equipped ships armed with 
the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA interceptor.26 In 2003, Japan decided to deploy the SM-
3 Block IA on-board its Aegis-equipped ships.27 In December 2005, the Japanese Cabinet and 
Security Council approved the joint development with the United States of the SM-3 Block IIA 
interceptor.28 Tokyo might, eventually, also deploy an Aegis-Ashore SM-3 Block IIA system in 
mainland Japan similar to the system currently being deployed in Europe.29 Japan tested the SM-
3 Block IA missiles for the first time in 2007. An aegis-equipped Japanese warship, the JS 
Kongo, was used to track and intercept a mock target missile.30 Presently Japanese Navy 
operates four Kongo class Aegis-equipped ships: Kongo, Chokai, Myoko, and Kirishma.31  
 
In 2010, Japan decided to increase the number of Aegis-equipped BMD ships to six along with 
“four newly developed ground-based X-band radar sets (FPS-5), upgrades of seven radar 
systems (upgraded FPS-3), and modification of the Japan Air-Defense Ground Environment 
(JADGE), an automated integrated air-defense system.”32 To support Japan’s missile defense 
mission, the United States has deployed, among other things, a PAC-3 battalion at Okinawa. The 
United States has also deployed a forward-based X-band radar at the JASDF’s Shariki Garrison 
in May 2006.33 A second X-band radar was deployed to Kyogamisaki in December 2014.34 The 
United States presently deploys five Aegis-equipped missile defense-capable destroyers in Japan. 
In 2014, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that “in response to 
Pyongyang’s pattern of provocative and destabilizing actions…I can announce today that the 
United States is planning to forward-deploy two additional Aegis ballistic missile defense ships 
to Japan by 2017.”35 
 
In light of all these investments, are current missile defense deployments sufficient in tracking 
and destroying North Korean missiles?36 What sort of coordinated attack scenarios can the 
missile defenses hold up against? The discussion below will illustrate that the Asian Phased 
Adaptive Approach missile defense system fares quite well on the former, but poorly on the 
latter. Figure 2 below illustrates the defensive footprint (based on kinematic reach37) of an Aegis-
equipped Japanese naval vessel with SM-3 Block IA interceptors.38 The nominal footprint shown 
in the figure indicates that the SM-3 Block IA interceptors do provide good coverage over Japan, 
with some parts remaining exposed. 
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Figure 2: Nominal Defense Footprint of a Aegis-equipped Japanese ship loaded with SM-3 IA 
stationed in the Sea of Japan. The nominal footprint represents only the kinematic reach of the 
interceptor.  
Source: Author's Calculations 
 
However, a good footprint alone is not sufficient to execute missile defense missions. It should 
be understood that missile defense cannot provide a 100% guaranteed defense against every 
incoming missile. Rather, missile defenses are expected to intercept a significant fraction of an 
early salvo of missiles, thereby giving U.S. or Japanese forces sufficient time to respond. The 
presence of Japan’s missile defense systems will not completely eliminate the missile threat that 
U.S. or Japanese forces may face from North Korea. Specifically, a single Aegis-equipped 
Japanese ship could, in theory, have as many as 90 interceptors dedicated to missile defense.  
 
In operational reality, however, the numbers might be much lower.39 Figure 3 below shows the 
leakage rate (the number of missiles that pass through the missile defense shield) for a given 
missile defense system. If one interceptor is committed for every missile, then to obtain a 
leakage rate of 10% (i.e., 1 in 10 missiles leak through), the SM-3 Block IA interceptors have to 
possess a 90% probability of kill. A 90% probability of kill is an extremely optimistic value to 
expect. If the SM-3 Block IA interceptors possess a reduced probability of kill of 70%, then to 
maintain the 10% leakage rate would require two interceptors per incoming target missile. In that 
case, a Japanese Aegis-equipped naval vessel with 60 SM-3 Block IA interceptors (the rest of the 
missile load in the ship can be presumed to be dedicated to other functions like air-to-air  
defense, anti-submarine warfare or cruise missiles, etc.40) would be able to able to defend against 
only 30 North Korean missiles under optimistic conditions. North Korea, on the other hand, is 
believed to possess 250-300 Nodong missiles that could conceivably be launched in a short time 
window.41 The current inventory of four Japanese naval vessels would only be able to provide 
limited protection to critical civilian and/or military assets, particularly so if some of the ships 
are held back for later operations. A large North Korean attack salvo of around one hundred 
missiles could cause substantial damage to alliance forces or civilian populations. Nevertheless, 
the Aegis-equipped ships with SM-3 Block IAs along with the Patriot systems could offer a 
North Korean 
Launch Location 
Aegis BMD Ship 
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Figure 3: Leakage Rate of a Single Layer Missile Defense System 
Source: Author's Calculations 
 
 
Command and Control Challenges 
While the disparity between the available number of missile defense interceptors in Japan’s 
possession and offensive missiles in North Korea’s arsenal is a cause for concern, equally 
worrisome is the performance of missile defense systems to date. There have been significant 
lapses in the command and control procedures of the system in the past when it was called upon 
to establish a shield over Japan. 
 
For the past decade, Japan has been grappling with the process of establishing command and 
control procedures for defense in the event of a sudden missile attack. Beginning in July 2005, 
Japan amended its Self-Defense Forces Law to establish procedures that pre-delegated 
interceptor launch authority to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in the event of a rocket launch 
by North Korea if it overflew Japanese territory.42 This amendment permitted Japan’s “defense 
minister to issue an order—in accordance with procedures approved by the Prime Minister—to 
destroy an incoming object so as to prevent the loss of lives or damage to property on Japanese 
territory.”43 In October 2005, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee issued a 
document titled “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future” that 
included provisions for bilateral and joint operational coordination.44 As part of this initiative, 
the JASDF Air Defense Headquarters was relocated to Yokota Air Base where the United States 
Forces Japan (USFJ) is based.45 This relocation was intended to foster greater data sharing and 
integrated decision making between U.S. and Japanese forces in the event of a missile attack. In 
2007, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces established the Joint Staff Office (JSO) to better coordinate 
operational requirements of missile defense. This action was motivated by the realization that 
“Joint [military] operations is also an essential foundation for effective BMD, because the 
MSDF’s [Maritime Self-Defense Forces] Aegis vessels and the ASDF’s warning and 
N=Total number of interceptors 
W=Total number of apparent warheads (i.e. both warheads and 
decoys classified as warheads) 
W1=Total number of apparent warheads that leaks through the 
single layer defense 
P=probability of a single interceptor killing one apparent warhead 
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surveillance systems and Patriot missile defense systems are all part of the Japanese BMD 
system, and these assets should be closely coordinated for time-sensitive missile defense 
operations.”46 
 
While all these actions cumulatively showcase a desire from the Japanese and U.S. forward-
deployed forces to master the command and control cycle involved in missile defense 
interceptions, the real-world results have been less successful. In four instances to date, Japan 
and the United States have had an opportunity to demonstrate the system. In three instances 
(2006, 2009, and 2012), significant problems of command and control were uncovered.   
 
In the 2006 instance:47 
Despite the U.S. forces informing the SDF of the third missile launch on July 5 at 
4:59 a.m. and the MSDF Aegis destroyer [Kongo] being dispatched to the Sea of 
Japan, Kongo’s radar failed to detect any trace of ballistic missiles. Taepodong-2 was 
estimated to have a height of 1,000 km, which, theoretically, was supposed to be 
visible on Kongo’s radar after the launch, but because the missile never attained the 
necessary height or distance to be properly detected, it took some time for Japan to 
confirm that the third missile was indeed a Taepodong…and confused JDA officials 
kept asking each other, ‘Was the launch a failure, or what?’ It is speculated that the 
six other missiles had been Nodongs or Scuds, and Kongo’s radar detected 
trajectories of half of those missiles…Some defense officials speculated that the 
reason why Kongo was unable to detect the missiles was because the U.S. 
government did not relay all of their information to the Japanese Aegis, subsequently 
fueling the suspicion that ‘the U.S. does not trust us well enough.’48 
 
In the 2009 instance:49 
On 4 April [2009] at 12:16, the FPS-5 phased-array radar at Iioka, Chiba Perfecture, 
detected an object above the Sea of Japan. This information was sent to staff at Air 
Defense Headquarters, Fuchu, Tokyo. In accordance with procedure, the staff 
reported verbally to other headquarters staff, using the phrases “Iioka detected” and 
‘SEW [Shared Early Warning] detected’. However, there was a misunderstanding. 
At that time, SEW had not detected the missile launch. The voice-based information 
was immediately disseminated to the local government through the Cabinet 
Secretariat. Once minute later, the Joint Staff Office checked SEW information and 
noticed that SEW had not detected the missile launch. Accordingly, they reported 
that the 12:16 launch information was false. Finally, at 12:20, the corrected 
information—stating that no missile had been detected—was disseminated to the 
local government. According to the after-action report of 2009, the human error 
happened because one staff had been wrongly convinced that both FPS-5 and SEW 
had detected the missile launch.  
 
In contrast, the situation was reversed in April 2012:50 
On 13 April at 7:40 am, the MoD received SEW information from the US. However, 
it took time for other sensors to confirm the launch, to double check, and no Japanese 
sensors could detect it. For that reason, the GoJ’s [Government of Japan] 
announcement of the missile launch was delayed for about one hour. Finally at 8:23, 
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Defense Minister Naoki Tanaka announced the information at a press briefing, 
followed by a briefing by Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura at 8:37. The 
reason for this delay was that the GoJ had established a double-check principle to 
avoid the dissemination of false information, as had happened in 2009. In addition, 
in April 2012, North Korea’s missile exploded immediately after the launch. In 
general, radar cannot pick up objects below the horizon…therefore, both the ground-
based radar in Japan and the maritime-based radar of the Aegis vessel deployed in 
the Southern part of Japan could not detect the missile because it crashed before it 
rose above their horizon. This physical reality prevented the double-checking of the 
information released by the SEW space-based sensors. 
 
Since then, the performances of the missile defense units have been tested twice. In December 
2012, when North Korea launched a space launch vehicle, Japan was able to successfully 
disseminate early warning information to its local governments and between various missile 
defense military units quickly.51 Most recently, in anticipation of the February 7, 2016, launch of 
North Korea’s satellite launch vehicle, the Japanese Defense Minister, Gen. Nakatani, ordered 
Aegis-equipped missile defense warships and its PAC-3 missile defense units to, if needed, 
destroy components falling within its territory.52 The report on the performance of the missile 
defense forces in these instances is still forthcoming. Its judgment would be extremely 
illuminating in understanding the performance of the Japanese missile defense forces. However, 
the various command and control failures highlighted above does force one to question if the 
system will function effectively in the face of a surprise North Korean missile attack. 
 
 
China’s Opposition to U.S. and Japanese Missile Defense Deployments  
 
Chinese opposition to the deployment of missile defense in Northeast Asia by Japan and the 
United States falls under one of these reasons:53 “(1) TMD cooperation with the United States 
would mark a qualitative upgrading of the U.S.-Japan alliance; (2) Provision of TMD-related 
missile technologies—such as propulsion and guidance—could contribute to a Japanese 
offensive ballistic missile program; (3) TMD cooperation with Japan could provide the technical 
and political basis for Japanese “remilitarization.” Japan will first develop missile defenses (a 
‘shield’) and then may develop offensive missile forces (a ‘spear’); (4) Japanese deployment of 
upper-tier TMD could be used to defend Taiwan;54 (5) TMD development may spark an arms 
race in Asia between China and Japan and consequently between Taiwan and China; (6) TMD 
and National Missile Defense (NMD) are closely related, so Japanese participation in joint 
development of TMD will ultimately assist the United States in the development of NMD; and 
(7) ‘US-Japan cooperation on TMD will aggravate tensions on the Korean peninsula’ and ‘the 
nuclear and missile-related problems with Korea can only be settled by political means through 
dialogue.’” 
 
Beijing has had an innate suspicion regarding U.S. missile defense deployments and U.S. 
intentions in East Asia. A recent Chinese military text, The Science of Military Strategy, has, for 
example, asserted that U.S. missile defense in Asia is “creating increasingly serious effects on 
the reliability and effectiveness of a Chinese retaliatory nuclear attack.”55 Chinese personnel 
argue that missile defense deployments in their neighborhood would fundamentally alter the 
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strategic balance and stability between the United States and China and, in turn, would force 
China to increase its nuclear arsenal. China (and Russia) has consistently argued that any missile 
threats from North Korea are a pretext to deploy missile defenses targeting them.56 They contend 
instead that “political, legal and diplomatic means, to explore the possibility of gradually 
working out a global control system in prevention of the proliferation of missiles and related 
technologies, and to conduct extensive and non-discriminatory dialogue and cooperation” is the 
way to address such threats.57 
 
Although Washington is undertaking a missile defense plan that it clearly states is driven by 
legitimate U.S. and allies’ security considerations, China (and Russia) apparently have found it 
difficult to accept this U.S. articulation. Additionally, the United States has repeatedly pointed 
out that these systems do not and are not meant to alter strategic stability. For example, the 
recent U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Review stated: “Engaging China in discussions of U.S. 
missile defense plans is also an important part of our international efforts…maintaining strategic 
stability in the U.S.-China relationship is as important to the administration as maintaining 
strategic stability with other major powers.”58 The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review also made 
similar commitments.59 Conceivably, however, “in dealing with the US, prudent states are 
necessarily going to assume that its intentions are at best ambiguous, and more likely 
adversarial.”60 China (and Russia) tends to argue that even limited U.S. missile defense postures 
will over time accumulate increasing capabilities, and can therefore quickly convert such 
capability to a larger threatening posture.61 Such logic can be observed directly in Chinese stated 
opposition to the deployment of U.S. missile defense radars in the region. Wu Riqiang from 
China’s Renmin University, for example, suggests that “Beijing’s biggest concern is that such 
[missile defense] radars will be deployed close enough to China to register the decoy-
deployment process of strategic missiles…this prevents missile defense systems from being 
susceptible to mid-course decoy countermeasures, and should be seen as China’s red line.”62  
 
Of course, in theory, U.S. missile defense systems in the Asia-Pacific could be reconfigured to 
offer limited defenses against Chinese short- and medium-range missiles. And, while North 
Korean missile threats permeate the discourse on Japanese missile defense, it is not 
inconceivable for it to maintain the potential to ramp capabilities against China if a significant 
threat perception arises.63 Japan’s ambassador Imai Ryuichi, for example, said: “…with all the 
debate and trouble TMD has caused in the SDF, it would be foolish to think that Japan spends 
enormous amounts of money to only defend against two or three North Korean Taepo Dongs.”64 
However, such a reconfiguration would be of limited effectiveness given that China’s deployed 
missile arsenal is one of the most extensive in the world.65 China continues to modernize its 
missile arsenal and is also developing a number of newer and more capable offensive missiles.66 
China is believed to have around 1,200 short-range missiles. Its medium range-missile inventory 
could include as many as 400 CSS-6 missiles (with a range of 600 km) and around 85 CSS-5 
missiles (with a range of 1,750 km).67 China also possesses a significant number of other 
medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.68 These missiles could be targeted against 
U.S. forward-deployed forces, allied forces, and bases in the region.69 Succinctly capturing this 
aspect of the tensions between the United States and China on missile defense, former U.S. 
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I share the Chinese concern over the deleterious effect of an arms race in the region, 
but I believe that if an arms race does get underway it will have been stimulated by 
the extensive deployment of missiles, not the deployment of missile defenses…I am 
today more pessimistic about the future of United States-China relations than I have 
been for several decades.  
 
Presently, ranges of Chinese conventionally-armed missiles extend to U.S. bases as far away as 
Guam. Any debate on U.S. missile defense reductions in the region should, therefore, also 





Recurrent North Korean provocations have and will continue to shift Japanese preferences on 
missile defense to a more capable system. However, missile defense come with inherent 
limitations that under the best circumstances will provide only limited protection. Also, while the 
need to limit provoking China influences Japanese defense decisions, including the procurement 
and deployment of missile defense equipment, unless there is substantial change in the 
perception of the North Korea threat, it seems that such concerns will play only a secondary role. 
A jointly operated U.S.-Japan defensive system could turn out to be crucial to defend Japan and 
U.S. forward-deployed forces from North Korean threats, and in the larger context, help to 
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Ballistic Missile Defense in South Korea: Separate Systems Against a Common Threat 




Some of the most enduring disagreements in the alliance between the United States and the Republic of 
Korea (ROK) concern ballistic missile defenses (BMD). At the same time that South Korea has expanded its 
conventional offensive missile program, it has declined American proposals for a regionally integrated BMD 
architecture, insisting on developing its own national system in parallel to the defenses operated by U.S. 
Forces Korea (USFK). American appeals for interoperability between U.S. and ROK systems have been 
received cautiously, as were proposals to enhance its own BMD in Korea by introducing the Terminal High-
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to the Peninsula for several years. A desire for expanded autonomy in 
national security appears to underpin Seoul’s attitudes on BMD. Rather than rely passively on American 
protection against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, South Korea’s military leaders have focused on 
developing precision-strike capabilities to intimidate Pyongyang, and resisted simply accepting an American 
BMD umbrella. Even more than they desire greater independence from their American patron-ally, South 
Koreans are suspicious of entanglements with Japan, their former colonial master, whose own defensive 
systems are already integrated with the American regional BMD architecture. This outlook encourages the 






South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK) has the unusual distinction of hosting two 
unrelated ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems: one for the South Korean military and 
another for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). Despite the standing presence of over 25,000 American 
troops, yoked to South Korea’s armed forces in a Combined Forces Command (CFC); despite 
routine joint training and exercises between the two allies; and despite almost two decades of 
urgings from the United States to build an integrated BMD architecture, the two systems have 
remained separate. Even while Washington negotiated with Seoul for permission to enhance 
USFK’s defenses by deploying the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to 
the Peninsula, South Korea has remained committed to its own national Korean Air and Missile 
Defense (KAMD) system, based on a variety of technologies from different sources, including 
indigenously produced interceptors. Years of pledges by South Korean defense officials have 
produced little observable progress toward making the separate American and Korean systems 
interoperable, despite benefits for the effectiveness of allied BMD in the theater. 
 
South Korea’s approach to BMD is thus at a great remove from America’s experience with other 
allies. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), adopted early in the Obama 
administration, has been portrayed as a model for other regional architectures, but South Korea’s 
choices have allowed for only halting progress toward regional integration.1 While the missile 
threat from North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) justifies and 
motivates South Korea’s interest in BMD capabilities, it has not, by itself, determined the ROK’s 
approach. Instead, concerns unrelated to the operational effectiveness of any particular BMD 
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South Korean BMD Concerns 
 
The first and greatest issue has been cost relative to perceived benefit; very simply, the South 
Korean defense establishment has preferred to invest in offensive missile capabilities to 
intimidate North Korea with the threat of precision strikes. Not far behind is national pride, in the 
form of South Korea’s desire for greater independence from its patron-ally, the United States, 
and its resistance to entanglements with its former colonial master, Japan. Other considerations 
have included sensitivity to the concerns of China, which is South Korea’s top trading partner 
and main opportunity for leverage on North Korean behavior, and perhaps also the interests of 
South Korea’s own defense industries.  
 
Many of these issues and concerns have found their most visible expression in areas not 
immediately or uniquely linked to BMD. Korea has never truly been able to determine its own 
fate in the modern era; security issues therefore tend to impinge strongly on Korean national 
pride. One prominent example in the period discussed in this paper is the premature decision for 
the transfer of wartime operational control of the armed forces (OPCON) by 2012, initially 
agreed between the Minister of National Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense in fall 2006.2 
After North Korea’s armed attacks against South Korea in 2010, the allies began to reconsider 
the original timeline for OPCON transfer, and then substituted a “conditions-based” process 
without fixed dates. Nevertheless, the retention of the commitment to OPCON transfer by two 
subsequent pro-American governments in Seoul testifies to the power of national feelings in 
South Korea.3 These same feelings have informed repeated decisions to resist the adoption of a 
common, integrated BMD architecture. 
 
Another aspect of Korean nationalism, in the form of anti-Japanese sentiment, also helps to 
explain Seoul’s desire for a separate BMD system. The American BMD architecture in the Asia-
Pacific region is integrated with Japan’s; this is the system that Washington would like to see 
Seoul join. Even the mutually beneficial decision to share sensor data between the ROK the 
United States could therefore contribute indirectly to the defense of Japan, Korea’s former 
colonial master, whose intentions many Koreans continue to suspect. There are many examples 
of Korea’s allergy to Japan from the period under consideration; the most salient would be the 
April 2011 episode, when the Korean side balked at the last moment rather than sign an 
agreement with Japan to permit the sharing of sensitive defense data (a General Security of 
Military Information Agreement, or GSOMIA), finally concluded in in the months after North 
Korea’s fifth nuclear test, despite continued public opposition in South Korea. American efforts 
to bring about trilateral defense cooperation have had some incremental successes since this 
time, but the years-long delay in signing the ROK-Japan GSOMIA has been emblematic of the 
serious obstacles to cooperation.4 
 
A third factor, involving the dominant perspective in China on the significance of BMD 
deployments, may also have contributed to South Korea’s go-slow approach on acquiring BMD 
and especially on achieving interoperability with American systems. China is South Korea’s 
most important trading partner by far; it is also widely viewed as the only country capable of 
keeping the North Koreans in line. Probably for these reasons, Seoul has at times shown 
sensitivity to China’s concerns about the American alliance network perched on its doorstep, 
including the role of BMD. A special concern sometimes reflected in the Chinese media is the 
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tendency of a multinational BMD architecture to embed the U.S. military more deeply in the 
region.5  
 
A fourth potential concern may be a desire to create greater opportunities for South Korea’s 
defense industry. In practice, this concern can be difficult to distinguish from nationalistic 
sentiment; the belief that independent defense capabilities are crucial to the ROK’s autonomy 
goes hand-in-hand with favoring indigenous defense development and production. It is also 
consistent with South Korea’s long history of industrial policy, including export-oriented 
industry. The defense sector has not been an exception to this pattern.6 
 
Many of these factors appear to have been in play in the recent debate over the deployment of 
THAAD. USFK officials have described the need for these high-altitude interceptors in Korea in 
order to create a “layered defense,” a BMD architecture that permits multiple shots at an 
incoming warhead. After years of discussion in the media, public opposition from the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a debate in Seoul over whether THAAD in Korea could 
somehow contribute to the defense of Japan, the United States and South Korea finally agreed to 
discuss the deployment. Formal talks began soon after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in 
January 2016 and its second successful space launch in February 2016.7 An agreement to deploy 
was announced in July.8 
 
From a U.S. perspective, South Korea’s reticence has created obstacles to the highly 
collaborative, trilateral defense relationship that the United States has sought to establish 
between itself, Japan, and South Korea since the late 1990s. The ROK’s insistence on a separate, 
parallel BMD system features prominently in this story, not least of all because an effective 
multinational BMD architecture would involve close ties between the allies’ command-and-
control networks.  
 
Reviewing the history of South Korea’s own BMD programs from the mid-1990s to the present 
shows the enduring strength of these concerns. Despite South Korea’s recent movement toward 
cautious acceptance of an enhanced U.S. BMD system on its territory, these issues seem unlikely 
to abate in the foreseeable future. 
 
 
Early Choices: Low Cost and Self-Reliance  
 
South Korea has faced a threat from hundreds of North Korean theater ballistic missiles since 
roughly the late 1980s. Seoul’s concern about the threat grew after a series of North Korean 
ballistic missile flight-tests on May 29, 1993, florid threats from Pyongyang during the nuclear 
crisis of June 1994, and the start of USFK’s deployment of Patriot batteries to protect its own 
facilities.9 These events may have contributed to the start of serious discussions within the ROK 
Ministry of National Defense (MND), no later than fall 1995, about launching a new air and 
missile defense program. This undertaking was justified in terms of the need to replace South 
Korea’s aging fleet of U.S.-supplied Nike-Hercules air-defense missiles.10   
 
One path for the acquisition of a BMD system might have been to acquire new, up-to-date 
systems from a single supplier. Instead, South Korean leaders have persistently sought an 
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independent course, and have resisted the American plans to integrate South Korea for a regional 
BMD architecture that would emerge later in the decade.  
 
Cost concerns were prominent in the information disclosed to the public about the new, so-called 
“SAM-X” program. Media reports starting in early 1996 indicated that the MND was 
considering not only Raytheon’s Patriot systems, but also their Russian counterpart, the Almaz-
Antey S-300. The Russian offering was deemed the leading candidate on the grounds of cost. 
Russia had borrowed heavily from South Korea in the early 1990s, and found in discounted 
military exports to Seoul a way to pay down its debt.11 South Korean interest in acquiring 
Russian systems naturally invited concern from the U.S. military. In May 1998, the USFK 
commander openly voiced his concern about the need for interoperability of American and South 
Korean defensive systems.12 
 
American advice, or pressure, seems to have helped to refocus the SAM-X program on Patriot 
PAC-3 BMD systems, but this shift led to seemingly insuperable cost problems. Although SAM-
X survived defense budget cuts after the financial crisis of 1997 and the election of opposition 
leader Kim Dae-jung to the presidency, it was subjected to repeated, years-long delays on 
account of lack of adequate funding.13  Shortfalls in funding became an enduring theme in South 
Korean BMD acquisition from this time on, even as the country’s own ballistic and cruise 
missile programs have prospered.14 
 
North Korea’s launch of a TD-1 multistage rocket over Japan on August 31, 1998 renewed 
interest in the United States in establishing a National Missile Defense (NMD) and a regional, 
multinational Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in Northeast Asia, an idea that Japan was quick to 
embrace.15 The South Korean leadership was reticent about involvement from the start. Even 
once the MND had accepted the need for a Patriot buy, Minister of National Defense Chun 
Yong-tack drew a sharp line against participating in the U.S. architecture, questioning its 
efficacy for deterring North Korea, citing the potential response of other regional countries, i.e., 
China, and noting South Korea’s own lack of sufficient funds, and its lack of advanced defense 
technology. His successors would offer similar statements as well.16  
 
Seoul may well have been wary of involvement in a defense architecture that could be seen as 
participating in the “containment” of China; keeping China closer to the ROK than the DPRK 
has been an important South Korean objective since the end of the Cold War. Minister Chun’s 
reference to defense technology was perhaps even more significant, reflecting the yearning to 
achieve greater self-reliance in defense. Always being in need of superior foreign technology for 
national defense would mean that the ROK would never be able to choose its own course.17 
Implicitly, if the DPRK could build its own missiles to threaten the ROK, then the ROK should 
be able to make its own missile defenses, not to mention missiles for threatening retaliation, 
unless it was content to rely permanently on the protection of the United States. Under the 
presidency of Kim Dae-jung, too, South Korea’s approach to the North leaned toward diplomacy 
and aid rather than new defense expenditures.  
 
Although South Korea was too hard-pressed financially to invest the anticipated roughly one 
trillion won (about $1 billion) needed to acquire a state-of-the-art theater BMD system like PAC-
3, it was able to set aside about 10 billion won (about $10 million) for the Agency for Defense 
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Development (ADD) to start development of an indigenous “medium-range surface-to-air 
missile,” or M-SAM, starting in 1998. (ADD is the developer of South Korea’s indigenous 
missile systems, which bear a close visual resemblance to Russian short-range ballistic missiles.) 
This small effort was expected to take a decade to bear fruit, and was described at the outside as 
involving the assistance from “Russia and other advanced countries.”18  
 
Over time, M-SAM would be portrayed as an anti-aircraft weapon, designed to replace older 
U.S.-supplied Hawk SAMs. The first production M-SAM systems, renamed Cheongung, were 
deployed to the Northwest Islands by early 2016.19 
 
In the meantime, the X-SAM program, which was supposed to fill the gap in South Korea’s 
defenses by acquiring PAC-3 or its equivalent, continued to make little progress. The MND 
failed to find a viable path for acquisition until 2005, when it identified a solution in the form of 




The Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) Concept 
 
Another reason for the slow path to acquisition of BMD was, in all likelihood, a lack of urgency. 
After the launch of the TD-1 over Japan in August 1998, North Korea had agreed to a 
moratorium in space launches and missile tests. Pyongyang adhered to this policy of restraint 
until July 2006, when it flight-tested a barrage of theater ballistic missiles, along with a three-
stage TD-2 launcher. In October 2006, it conducted its first nuclear test. Later that year, South 
Korea announced the development of a new BMD architecture, the Korean Air and Missile 
Defense (KAMD), which officials described as “affordable.” Early media accounts of KAMD 
described it as featuring a network of Patriot batteries, a new, indigenously developed early-
warning radar, and its own dedicated command center.21  
 
In 2008, Seoul’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) finally concluded the 
purchase of the secondhand German PAC-2s, to be linked by new fire-control systems from 
Raytheon. The first shipment from Germany arrived in South Korea late that year, about 13 years 
after the initial decision to replace the superannuated Nike-Hercules. The newly acquired 
interceptors were deployed around ROK Air Force bases.22  
 
Now apparently feeling some urgency to erect a national BMD system, Seoul set aside the idea 
of an indigenous early-warning radar. In fall 2009, DAPA decided to purchase two Super Green 
Pine radars from Israel’s Elta. These radars were originally designed to work with the Arrow 
BMD interceptor jointly developed by the United States and Israel.23 Thus, KAMD was taking 
shape rapidly, with a minimum of equipment purchased directly from the United States. 
 
But even as South Korea continued to receive shipments of old PAC-2 equipment from 
Germany, the MND concluded that these systems were ineffective against the North Korean 
missile threat. The equipment was outmoded and better suited to intercepting aircraft than 
missiles. The aging PAC-2 tracking radars broke down frequently and proved difficult to 
maintain.24  
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In consultations with the United States in late 2012, the government expressed renewed interest 
in acquiring new PAC-3 systems, to be deployed at an early date.25 The U.S. Department of 
Defense received formal notice of Seoul’s interest in a possible purchase in October 2013.26 
Indeed, as early as 2008, descriptions of KAMD future development had broadened to include 
new U.S.-made interceptors, in the form of Raytheon’s SM-2 missiles, to be deployed abroad 
South Korea’s new Aegis-class destroyers.27 Later accounts also indicated an interest in the SM-
6 interceptor, then under development.28  
 
Two other new acquisition tracks also emerged under the KAMD umbrella. The first was naval, 
and moved briskly. As early as January 2008, descriptions of the architecture’s future 
development broadened to include Raytheon’s SM-2 missiles, to be deployed aboard the ROK 
Navy’s new Aegis-capable destroyers.29 Perhaps reflecting ambivalence within Seoul, the 
purchase and delivery of SM-2s have not been highly publicized. A DOD notice from May 2009 
documenting South Korean interest in buying a batch of SM-2s noted that the ROK “already has 
these missiles in its inventory.”30 (Some SM-2s would be displayed in an October 2013 Armed 
Forces Day parade in Seoul.) Later accounts also expressed interest in acquiring the new SM-6 
multi-role naval missile, which operates in both defensive and anti-ship modes.31  
 
The second acquisition track involved more indigenous systems. At the same time that the 
shortcomings of the German PAC-2s were first brought before the public eye, MND also 
revealed news plans for developing another indigenous BMD interceptor, a program called L-
SAM.32 L-SAM has been depicted as an upper-tier interceptor for a layered defense, with the 
lower tier composed of PAC-3 and M-SAM batteries.33 This high-altitude intercept role may 
suggest an additional, unstated reason for Seoul’s early reluctance to discuss an American 
THAAD deployment to Korea; although THAAD is expected to be USFK’s system, and not 
South Korea’s, its presence in Korea might undercut the rationale for L-SAM. 
 
Regardless of the exact configuration, the rapid emergence of the initial KAMD system seems to 
have pushed U.S.-ROK discussions toward the subject of interoperability between allied defense 
systems. South Korean Ministers of National Defense issued essentially identical pledges to 
achieve this goal in each joint statement of the annual ministerial-level U.S.-ROK Security 
Consultative Meeting (SCM) since 2012.34  
 
Despite the operational advantages of having defensive assets exchange data and coordinate 
actions in combat, interoperability appears to have been a source of discomfort for the South 
Koreans. American officials may have contributed to that discomfort by linking the theme of 
interoperability to the unpopular subject of trilateral defense cooperation with Japan, speaking in 
terms of “an interoperable regional missile defense architecture.”35  
 
Perhaps the first concrete indication of progress on interoperability appeared in January 2016, 
when the MND announced plans to install a Link 16 tactical data link between the allies’ 
respective BMD command centers at Osan Air Base.36 The U.S. BMD system uses Link 16 to 
connect the other elements of the system to a Command and Control, Battle Management, and 
Communications System.37 The MND announcement emphasized that the data link would run 
only between the two command centers, which implicitly will remain separate despite their 
proximity, and will not have direct and unmediated access to each other’s BMD assets. Shortly 
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thereafter, it was also announced that the allies would undertake a joint BMD exercise during the 
annual spring military exercises.38 For the time being, at least, this modest level of 
interoperability seems to represent the extent of Seoul’s willingness. 
 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
Overall, KAMD seems to have had little in the way of a consistent system design, and remains 
very much a work in progress. It has emerged as a patchwork quilt—an improvisational 
assemblage of technologies from a variety of foreign and domestic suppliers. Its only fixed 
characteristic is the first word in its name: Korean. Whatever form it may take, KAMD is the 
national BMD system of the Republic of Korea, as opposed to a joint or regional architecture.  
 
This pattern reflects Seoul’s tendency to respond to a variety of pressures and concerns by 
delaying acquisition of big-ticket American systems, selecting low-cost alternatives when 
possible, and investing in locally produced alternatives, all while insisting on the maximum 
operational autonomy. It is invariably North Korean missile and nuclear tests that have spurring 
greater interest in BMD in Seoul and, at least temporarily, greater willingness to collaborate with 
the United States in the BMD field. 
 
As a result, South Korean defense officials have improvised a meandering course on BMD 
development and acquisition, now steering closer to their American partners, now further away. 
American officials may periodically get an impression of progress, but so far that progress 
remains tentative and incremental. With time, as Seoul’s technological capabilities mature, it is 
likely to shift toward an increasingly independent defense posture. Short of a fundamental shift 
in South Korean views on defense technology, national autonomy, or regional politics and 
security, no trilateral BMD system including the U.S. and Japan should be expected to take 
shape. 
 
A certain tension can be seen in South Korea’s approach: the desire to keep costs under control 
conflicts with the goal of avoiding integration into a joint or multinational architecture. A 
multinational approach would presumably offer the best value in terms of operational 
effectiveness, since it would involve relatively mature technologies and take advantage of 
investments already made by foreign partners. Insisting on a low-cost approach to BMD has 
actually forced Seoul to accept some degree of dependence. For example, ROK defense officials 
have felt compelled to explain to reporters that a data link between command centers is desirable, 
since it will give South Korea access to U.S. space-based early warning data—something the 
ROK cannot afford to duplicate. 
 
Faced with this situation, perhaps the most constructive approach for the United States would be 
to consider proposing a jointly developed U.S.-ROK defensive architecture, separate from its 
U.S.-Japanese equivalent, which would create a joint capability at substantial cost savings for 
South Korea. While this approach would not resolve all South Korean concerns, it would help to 
remove the most acute issue. Despite a desire for greater freedom of action, as well as anxiety 
about the intentions of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, South Korea’s leaders are far from 
ready to separate themselves from their alliance from the United States. The continuing USFK 
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presence helps to deter serious North Korean aggression, and may even be seen as offering a 
counterweight to China’s growing military power. Seoul’s interest in BMD has grown since the 
end of the North Korean missile-test moratorium and the first North Korean nuclear test, both in 
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Timeline 
 
Late 1980s: Emergence of a large-scale North Korean theater ballistic missile threat. 
 
May 29, 1993: Four North Korean theater ballistic missile tests. 
 
June 1994: North Korean nuclear crisis. 
 
October 1995: Earliest South Korean media references to SAM-X program. 
 
1995-1996: Earliest USFK Patriot deployments. 
 
August 31, 1998: North Korean TD-1 space launcher overflies Japan. 
 
November 1998: Earliest South Korean media references to M-SAM program. 
 
July 4 and 5, 2006: North Korean ends missile testing moratorium with six theater ballistic 
missile tests and first TD-2 space launch attempt. 
 
October 9, 2006: First North Korean nuclear test. 
 
October 2006: Earliest South Korean media references to Korean Air and Missile Defense 
(KAMD). 
 
2008: Negotiations to acquire German PAC-2 systems are concluded; deliveries to South Korea 
commence. 
 
January 2008: Earliest South Korean media references to interest in acquisition of SM-2 naval 
interceptors from the United States. 
 
February 2008: Earliest South Korean media references to interest in acquisition of SM-6 naval 
interceptors from the United States. 
 
2009: Negotiations to acquire Israeli Super Green Pine radars are concluded. 
 
May 2009: South Korean possession of SM-2 naval interceptors is publicized for the first time 
by the U.S. Department of Defense. 
 
October 2011: Earliest South Korean media references to L-SAM program. 
 
October 2012: Earliest South Korean media references to interest in acquisition of PAC-3 
systems from the United States. 
 
October 1, 2013: ROK Armed Forces Day parade in Seoul displays multiple missile systems, 
including SM-2 naval interceptors. 
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Early 2016: First Cheongung (M-SAM) systems reported deployed. 
 
January 7, 2016: Fourth North Korean nuclear test, called its first thermonuclear test. 
 
February 7, 2016: North Korea conducts its second fully successful TD-2 launch. 
 
February 7, 2016: USFK releases text of a joint ROK-U.S. statement on negotiations 
concerning THAAD deployment in South Korea. 
 
July 7, 2016: USFK announces ROK-U.S. agreement on THAAD deployment. 
 
September 9, 2016: Fifth North Korean nuclear test. 
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Seeing Missile Defense as U.S. Hostility, North Korea Aims at More and Better Weapons 




North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have spurred Japan and South Korea to develop their own 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems and to regenerate their interest in regional missile defense 
cooperation with the United States. Has North Korea reacted to such developments, and if so, how? This 
paper looks at North Korea’s missile capacity development as well as its official proclamations and 
concludes that while Pyongyang likely does not believe that it is the region’s sole target for U.S. and allied 
BMD, it feels deeply threatened by its deployment. Existing and potential BMD systems have not 
discouraged Pyongyang from building its own missiles. Rather, North Korea is accelerating its efforts to 
improve and expand its missile arsenal to develop a survivable force, likely perceiving BMD systems as 





North Korea is believed to have begun developing its missile capability in the 1960s, and has 
acquired proficiency in a short time for a country of its technological and economic level.1 By 
1984, Pyongyang had reverse-engineered the Scud-B and flight-tested its own version, dubbed 
the Hwasong-5, with a range of 320 km. By the early 1990s it was producing the 1,500 km range 
Nodong missile.2 Currently, the country is believed to have as many as 1,000 missiles that can 
target its neighbors,3 and is continuing to develop longer-range missiles that could threaten the 
continental United States while steadily making progress in its nuclear weapons program. To 
counter the threat posed by North Korea’s improved missile capability, the United States has 
expanded its deployment of BMD assets in the Asia-Pacific region,4 the most recent embodiment 
of which is the U.S.-South Korean announcement in July to deploy a Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense (THAAD) battery in South Korea. The North Korean threat has also led U.S. allies 
Japan and South Korea to acquire their own BMD capabilities and spurred some interest in 
regional cooperation.5 
 
How has North Korea reacted to these developments? Have the North Koreans changed the pace 
of their missile program development because of American and allied ballistic missile defense? 
This paper explores these questions through an analysis of North Korea’s actions and comments. 
The paper will first examine North Korea’s efforts in missile capability enhancement, followed 
by its official pronouncements on the topic. It will then discuss the interpretations of North 
Korea’s words and actions and conclude with an analysis of its possible motivations.  
 
 
What North Korea has Done 
 
The pace of North Korea’s missile tests has accelerated in the years since Kim Jong Un took 
office. The number of tests of projectiles of all ranges in the five years under Kim Jong Un’s 
leadership is more than three times than that of the 13 years from August 1998, when North 
Korea fired an SLV over Japan, the militarized version of which would be the Taepodong-1.6 
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Among the tests that have been carried out under the two North Korean leaders are those for 
long-range missiles, which North Korea refrained from conducting between September 1999 and 
July 2006 under a moratorium Pyongyang promised to maintain while it was in talks with the 
United States. The two countries came close to negotiating a comprehensive missile agreement, 
but time ran out for the administration of Bill Clinton to reach such a deal.7  North Korea 
announced an end to the moratorium in 2005. 8 
 
These tests have led to significant technical advances, most notably the improvement of North 
Korea’s Taepodong-2, a militarized version of the Unha SLV. The rocket, which if reconfigured 
as a missile could reach the continental United States, successfully put a satellite into orbit in 
December 2012, after three failed tests since July 2006. Whether it can be used successfully as a 
missile is still questionable, however, as North Korea likely continues to face technical hurdles 
such as the development of a reliable reentry vehicle that can withstand atmospheric entry and 
carry a weapon to its target.9  
 
Apart from the long-range missiles, the tests carried out under Kim Jong Un’s leadership indicate 
the country is seeking ways to diversify its missile force. A particular emphasis has been on 
achieving greater mobility to increase the likelihood that missiles will survive during combat.10   
 
This effort includes the development of road-mobile missiles with longer ranges, such as the 
Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile, which can reach American bases in Guam. North 
Korea is believed to have conducted eight rounds of Musudan test firings in 2016, partially 
succeeding in at least one launch.11 
 
While a flight test has yet to be confirmed, North Korea is also developing the KN-08, which is a 
road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach the continental United States. 12 
 
Yet another example of North Korea’s effort to achieve greater mobility is its testing of the 
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).  North Korea launched SLBMs three times in 
2016, one of which traveled 500 km, making it the most successful attempt thus far.13 The 
development of North Korean SLBMs is significant, as hard-to-detect submarines would give 
North Korea a potential second strike capability, or the ability to withstand a first strike and 
retaliate.  Being mobile, the SLBMs can also strike South Korea from directions that are not 
covered by THAAD radars.14  
 
Pyongyang is also working on solid fuel rocket technology that would make its missiles quicker 
to launch and easier to store and transport.15 The country is believed to have tested a large solid 
fueled rocket motor in March 2016, an indication of a desire to use them in missiles with a 
longer range than the short-range battlefield weapons they currently use them in.16 North Korea 
is believed to have utilized solid fuel in an SLBM test launch in April that flew a distance of 
about 30 km.17  
 
North Korea has also made steady technical progress on the nuclear front in the decade since its 
first nuclear test in 2006. It conducted its fifth nuclear test in September 2016, achieving the 
largest explosion to date at the equivalent of 10 kilotons of TNT.18  
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North Korea has also made these technical improvements much more visible to both the 
domestic and international audience in recent years. Since 2014, the country’s official media has 
repeatedly published articles about leader Kim Jong Un observing missile drills, a highly unusual 
move until that time19 that has provided the outside world with material through which it can 
glean the country’s progress. A notable example of such coverage is Kim’s March 2016 visit to a 
facility that contained ballistic missiles, a compact nuclear weapon and a reentry body.20 During 
this visit, Kim claimed that the country has successfully miniaturized a nuclear warhead to fit on 
a missile, a necessary requirement for an operational ballistic missile-based nuclear capacity.21  
 
North Korea under Kim Jong Un has also placed more political emphasis on missile 
development by renaming and elevating the status of its Missile Guidance Bureau to the 
Strategic Rocket Force in 2012. The new unit is believed to have the same status as the North 
Korean ground forces, Navy, Air and Anti-Air Force, making up the fourth force within the 
Korean People’s Army (KPA).22 
 
 
What North Korea has Said 
 
Has North Korea explained its motivations behind its missile development? The official 
proclamations of government ministries as well as its state-run media offer some clues.23 
 
North Korea clearly views American and allied BMD systems as a threat. The July 2016 
announcement by the United States and South Korea that they will deploy a THAAD battery in 
South Korea24 triggered intense criticism from the KPA, which threatened to take “physical 
counteraction,”25 as well as the North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman26 and the Rodong 
Sinmun, a newspaper of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK).27 
 
While the announcement on THAAD has prompted an increase in the number of critical 
commentary on American and allied BMD systems, North Korea’s complaint of their 
deployment is not new. North Korea’s official pronouncements have argued for years that the 
deployment of American and allied BMD systems will provide a powerful shield for the United 
States that would make it easier to carry out preemptive attacks. For example, Minju Joson, the 
government newspaper, says in a July 2006 commentary: 
 
What the U.S. is after is to freely carry into action its preemptive strike 
strategy after setting up a colossal missile defense system at every 
strategic vantage and binding other countries hand and foot to neutralize 
their means of retaliation.28 
 
Regardless of whether the comments are made by a Foreign Ministry official—which is among 
the higher in authority among North Korean proclamations—or in the form of an opinion piece 
in newspapers affiliated with the government or the ruling WPK, they are consistent in their 
argument that North Korea and Iran are not the only targets of U.S. BMD. The commentaries 
argue that the BMD systems’ cost and geographical scope indicate that the United States has a 
larger plan aimed particularly at containing China and Russia. The Korean Central News Agency 
(KCNA) said in a commentary in July 2013: 
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The U.S. moves to establish a missile defense system (MD) in the Asia-
Pacific region is a clear indication of its sinister intention to contain the 
powers and maintain and further strengthen its military hegemony in the 
region. … The U.S. is pushing ahead with its MD in a bid to stifle the 
DPRK any time and to contain the regional powers. The MD operational 
range covers the powers and the strategic vantage points in the Asia-
Pacific region. The U.S. moves to build a missile shield is, in essence, the 
establishment of a powerful missile attack system to target the Eurasian 
continent.29 
 
Another argument frequently used in the commentaries is that American and allied BMD 
systems are aimed at upsetting the regional security balance by weakening or disabling the 
strategic deterrent forces of the Asia-Pacific region.30 The commentaries also often contend that 
the United States is only using missile threats from North Korea as an excuse to deploy BMD 
assets in the region31 and that Washington is trying to spark an arms race.32  
 
While critics of U.S. BMD see it as technically unreliable, North Korea has been less vocal about 
its judgment. The Artillery Bureau of the KPA General Staff said in response to the U.S.-South 
Korea decision to deploy THAAD that the system was “unfinished” and that its “military 
effectiveness has not been verified,”33 and a spokesman for the National Defense Commission’s 
Policy Department called BMD defense assets in South Korea “threadbare”34 in a 2013 
statement, but these comments are the exception rather than the rule in official pronouncements. 
 
As for how to counter what North Korea sees as systems hostile to its defense, the commentaries 
argue that North Korea has no choice but to strengthen its military power. A spokesman for a 
Foreign Ministry think tank said in a 2015 statement: 
 
The deployment of THAAD in  south (sic) Korea would further increase 
the danger of conflict among powers in Northeast Asia. This will compel 
the DPRK to bolster up its military capability to cope with it as the DPRK 
will be exposed to its threat.35 
 
The statement was referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea. 
 
What can be gleaned from a reading of North Korean statements is that the country sees the 
deployment of American and allied BMD systems as a serious threat, even if it does not view 
itself as the system’s only target, and that it believes it needs to develop a stronger capability to 
deal with the threat. 
 
 
What We Don’t Know 
 
The previous two portions of this paper showed that North Korea has not only significantly 
grown its own missile capability over the years but has accelerated its efforts recently, and that it 
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perceives the deployment of American and allied BMD systems as a significant threat to the 
country. However, reaching a conclusion as to whether there is a cause and effect at work––that 
is, whether BMD is fueling North Korea’s missile development—is complicated by two factors. 
 
The first problem is that it is difficult to separate the threat that North Korea perceives from the 
deployment of American and allied BMD assets from other types of external threats.  
 
Two events are believed to have convinced North Korea that nuclear weapons are crucial for its 
survival: the U.S. attack on Libya in March 2011, eight years after it successfully pressured 
Libya to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs; and the Israeli airstrike in 2007 on 
the North Korean reactor under construction in Syria.36 Is North Korea’s drive to improve its 
nuclear and missile capability fueled fundamentally by such threat perceptions, rather than any 
U.S. actions on BMD? Or is the threat from U.S. and allied BMD the more important factor 
accelerating Pyongyang’s efforts to acquire a more sophisticated and varied missile force? 
 
The second factor is that North Korea’s efforts to strengthen its missile capability could also 
have its origins in its inherent weakness.  
 
Some analysts point out that North Korea can never be confident of its ability to protect a small 
nuclear arsenal due to its geographical size, economic level and the degree of technical 
sophistication, and would logically have to continue building its nuclear and missile capability.37 
According to this view, North Korea will never achieve an assured second strike capability as it 
is too small to aim for the geographical dispersion of weapons that was pursued by the Soviet 
Union and too poor to build an effective SLBM force or capable air defense.38   
 
Interpretations of North Korea’s words and actions on the nuclear and missile developments 
vary. The U.S. Department of Defense believes that Pyongyang needs its nuclear and missile 
programs as “a credible deterrence capability essential to its survival, sovereignty, and 
relevance” and for supporting “its coercive military threats and actions.”39 Other analysts believe 
that North Korea’s current strategy is aimed at a more credible assured retaliation capability, but 
worry that it could evolve into one that includes options for the limited initial use of nuclear 
weapons.40 Yet others have said that North Korea’s harsh statements on American and allied 
ballistic missile defense deployments may have been a means to stake out a bargaining position 
when Pyongyang was still holding talks with five other countries on its nuclear programs, the last 





North Korea has made significant technical progress in missile development over the past 
decades, and has accelerated its efforts to qualitatively improve its missile force in recent years.  
On the political front, it has publicized its missile development efforts in a way that it has not 
done before and has elevated the political profile of its missile unit domestically.  
 
North Korea’s official pronouncements on BMD assets of the United States and its allies show 
that it perceives them as a serious threat. On the other hand, Pyongyang suspects that the 
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expensive and geographically dispersed U.S. system is aimed not only at countries like itself and 
Iran, but also at China and Russia. It sees the effort as part of overall U.S. policy that is hostile to 
the country and perceives the need to strengthen its military capability to counter it. 
 
It is difficult to separate the threat North Korea perceives from U.S. and allied BMD systems 
from other external threats, and to differentiate whether North Korea is strengthening its missile 
force in reaction to U.S. BMD systems or to make up for its inherent weaknesses. But North 
Korea’s recent efforts aimed at a more varied and mobile missile force in particular suggests that 
it is trying to evade the U.S. and allied BMD technology. Judging from its words and actions, 
North Korea is likely working to develop a stronger missile force at least partly due to the threat 
it faces from U.S. and allied BMD efforts, perceiving it as part of an overall U.S. policy against 
the country. 
 
What this means for U.S. and allied BMD systems is that their deployment is unlikely to 
discourage North Korea from trying to build better and more varied missiles. That factor should 
be weighed in any calculations of the batteries’ deployment. 
  
 




August 1998: North Korea launches a satellite launch vehicle (SLV) over Japan, the militarized 
version of which would be the Taepodong-1 with a range of 1,500-2,000 km. Pyongyang 
announces that the rocket successfully placed a small satellite into orbit. 
 
September 1999: North Korea agrees to a moratorium on testing long-range missiles for the 
duration of missile talks with the United States. 
 
July 2006: North Korea test fires seven ballistic missiles, including an SLV whose militarized 
version is the Taepodong-2. The SLV fails less than a minute after launch. 
 
October 2006: North Korea conducts its first nuclear test. 
 
April 2009: North Korea launches another SLV and claims the rocket put a satellite into orbit. 
 
May 2009: North Korea conducts its second nuclear test. 
 
March 2010: South Korean navy ship Cheonan is sunk near the maritime border of the two 
Koreas. 
 
November 2010: North Korea fires artillery rounds at the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, 
killing two soldiers, two civilians and injuring 16 people 
 
April 2012: North Korea launches another SLV. It falls apart after about 90 seconds. 
 
December 2012: North Korea launches an SLV and claims to put a satellite into orbit. The 
North American Aerospace Defense Command confirms that an object achieved orbit. 
 
February 2013: North Korea carries out its third nuclear test. 
 
March 2014: North Korea test-fires two medium-range Nodong missiles, violating UN 
sanctions. This was the first Nodong test since 2009. 
 
March 2014: North and South Korea exchange artillery fire in the disputed Yellow (West) Sea 
border. 
 
February 2015: North Korea tests a new anti-ship cruise missile. 
 
May 2015: North Korea claims to test a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), but 
outside observers say the launch was likely from a submerged barge. 
 
November 2015: North Korea reportedly tests SLBM. 
 
December 2015: North Korea reportedly tests another SLBM. 
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January 2016: North Korea conducts its fourth nuclear test, claiming to have detonated a 
hydrogen bomb for the first time. 
 
February 2016: North Korea launches another SLV.  
 
March 2016: North Korea is suspected of conducting a solid-fuel rocket engine test. 
 
April 2016: North Korea is suspected of conducting a large liquid-fuel rocket engine test. 
 
April 2016: North Korea launches intermediate-range Musudan missiles on April 15 and 28, 
which reportedly fail.  
 
April 2016: North Korea test-fires SLBM. 
 
May 2016: North Korea launches Musudan again, fails again. 
 
June 2016: North Korea carries out its fifth and sixth Musudan tests, one of which is a partial 
success. 
 
July 2016: United States, South Korea announce they will deploy Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea’s southeastern county of Seongju. 
 
July 2016: North Korea launches another SLBM, the second in 2016. 
 
July 2016: North Korea launches two presumed Scud missiles and a Nodong missile. 
 
August 2016: North Korea fires two Nodong missiles, one of which lands in the Sea of Japan, 
inside Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone. 
 
August 2016: North Korea test-fires its third SLBM, which travels 500 km, making it the most 
successful attempt so far. 
 
September 2016: North Korea fires three extended range Scud missiles. 
 
September 2016: North Korea conducts its fifth nuclear test, the largest explosion to date. 
 
October 2016: North Korea conducts what are believed to be its seventh and eighth Musudan 
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GCC Missile Defense: Obstacles on the Road to Integration 




The U.S.-led effort to establish a missile defense architecture for the Persian Gulf has been slower and less 
successful than the United States had hoped, mainly due to an unwillingness and inability to cooperate 
among the Gulf Security Council nations whose nations the system is designed to defend. Given, inter alia, 
Iran’s growing ballistic missile arsenal and unease with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in Gulf 
Arab capitals, security reassurances to the Gulf monarchies will become simultaneously more important and 
more difficult to make credible. In this environment, missile defense will be an important, but by no means 
sufficient, mechanism for assuring the Arab Gulf states. Cooperation on missile defense with the Gulf 
monarchies should continue, but with a realistic understanding of what is possible given the current chaos 





Under President Barack Obama, the United States shifted its missile defense focus from 
protection of the U.S. homeland to protection of forward-deployed U.S. forces and allies from 
regional ballistic missile threats.1 This strategy advocates and requires cooperation from allies; 
without assistance from regional partners, any ballistic missile defense (BMD) assets deployed to 
the region will amount to little more than point defense. The expectation that regional allies 
would move quickly to integrate their various BMD assets, share information, and develop a 
joint doctrine has not materialized, at least not with the speed that the United States had hoped. 
Even in Europe, where the missile defense architecture is being set up through NATO, the 
project has faced problems and limitations. However, the European Phased Adaptive Approach 
(EPAA), as it is called, now seems on target to meet the conclusion of its third phase, based on 
Aegis-equipped ships and Aegis Ashore deployments in Romania and Poland, by the end of 
2020. 
 
In contrast, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has been procuring advanced BMD systems 
and talking about integration of a BMD architecture for the Persian Gulf for years, but little 
progress has been made towards an architecture capable of deterring or defeating the threat posed 
by Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal.  
 
It is unclear if the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),2 the agreement signed by the 
P5+1 and Iran that limits the scope of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, 
will have a noticeable effect on the GCC’s willingness or ability to take the steps necessary to 
create an effective BMD architecture. The GCC states—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, 
the United Arab Emirates, and Oman—have publicly supported the deal but harbor varying 
degrees of suspicion about the agreement, Iran’s intent to abide by it, and what it may mean for 
regional order.     
 
This paper addresses the following questions: (1) What threats are ballistic missile defense in the 
Persian Gulf designed to address, and how might these threats change or evolve in the aftermath 
of the JCPOA; (2) What is currently being done to create a BMD architecture in the Persian 
Gulf; (3) What obstacles stand in the GCC’s way; (4) What lessons can be learned from the 
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BMD experience in Europe; (5) What role should the United States play in helping the GCC with 
its missile defense project; and (6) What would happen if the United States cut back on its 
commitment to provide BMD capabilities to the GCC? The answers to these questions will have 
implications for the Persian Gulf’s security and the relationship between the United States and its 
Gulf Arab allies.  
 
 
The Iranian Missile Threat and Regional Dynamics Before and After the JCPOA 
 
Ballistic missiles and rockets have a long history in the Middle East. The GCC states first 
witnessed their use during the 1980 – 1988 Iran-Iraq War. Both countries fired ballistic missiles 
at each other’s cities, sowing fear and causing panic, especially on the Iranian side.3 Towards the 
end of the war in 1988, Iraq fired close to 200 ballistic missiles at Iran, killing some 2,000 
people.4 These devastating strikes contributed to Iran’s decision to accept a ceasefire, 
demonstrating the political utility of ballistic missiles when employed against civilian targets. 
Iraq again employed ballistic missiles during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 when it launched 
dozens of Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel. While Iraq ultimately failed in its attempt to 
goad Israel into the war and thus fragment the U.S.-led coalition that included Arab enemies of 
Israel, it came perilously close. Only the reassuring deployment of Patriot missile defenses to 
Israel, along with strong diplomatic pressure, kept Israel out of the war. The effectiveness of 
Iraq’s missile arsenal did not go unnoticed in GCC capitals. 
 
Iraq’s use of ballistic missiles received the lion’s share of attention in the Arab Gulf from the 
1980s to the early 2000s, but during this time Iran also embarked on a large-scale ballistic 
missile development program. It first acquired Scud missiles from Libya in 1985, and then began 
a ballistic missile development program with assistance from North Korea.5 Iran now possesses 
the largest and most active ballistic missile program in the Middle East, with both short- and 
long-range missiles capable of hitting targets throughout the Gulf and even southern Europe. 
Exact estimates are not available, but it is believed that Iran possesses over 1,000 missiles with 
ranges varying from 150 km to 2,000 km.6    
 
The effectiveness of short-range rockets and missiles was driven home during the summer of 
2006, when Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy organization in Lebanon, fought a month-long war with 
Israel. Hezbollah fired over 4,000 short-range rockets (roughly 25 km) at Israel’s home front 
throughout the war, and despite the Israeli military’s best efforts to stop the barrages, Hezbollah 
was able to continue firing until a UN-imposed ceasefire was agreed to by both sides. Given the 
large number of rockets fired, a relatively small number of Israelis were killed—the rockets were 
unguided and thus unable to strike with any precision—but civilian life in Israel was paralyzed 
as people had to remain in their homes and bomb shelters for over a month. The inability of the 
Israel Defense Forces to stop the rocket fire despite its overwhelming superiority vis-à-vis 
Hezbollah’s guerilla army constituted an embarrassment for Israel and allowed Hezbollah to 
portray itself as the victor.7 Because Hezbollah is an organization funded, supplied, and directed 
by Iran, the Arab Gulf states viewed Hezbollah’s effective use of short-range rockets against 
Israel as a strategy devised by Iran that could one day be employed against them. To counter this 
threat, the GCC states began to acquire U.S.-made BMD systems, and have continued 
purchasing them over the last decade.8       
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On the tactical level, these BMD assets are being procured to complicate Iran’s decision-making 
by reducing its confidence in the effectiveness of missile raids against the Arab Gulf. If the 
GCC’s missile defenses are reasonably effective, the narrative of Iran’s powerful missile force 
striking the vulnerable Gulf monarchies would be turned on its head, constituting a propaganda 
coup for the GCC and an embarrassment for Iran. Instead, the perception would be one of a 
militarily-inferior Iran attempting to attack the more technologically-advanced GCC and failing. 
Again, an example of this can be seen by looking to Israel, where its Iron Dome anti-rocket 
system became a source of pride for Israelis during recent rounds of fighting against Hamas in 
the Gaza Strip.9 The possibility that Iran’s missile strategy might not have the intended effect if it 
were employed can help reduce the coercion value of Iran’s arsenal.  
 
With tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia flaring as of late, the possibility of a military 
confrontation between the two states cannot be ruled out. In such an event, the GCC’s missile 
defenses might actually be called upon to intercept Iranian missiles targeting their territory. This 
is a daunting challenge, and from the vantage point of the GCC, it is likely to become more 
challenging over the coming years because of the concessions made to Iran as part of the 
JCPOA.  
 
UNSCR 2231 (passed to approve the JCPOA and supersede other resolutions pertaining to Iran 
sanctions) states that the embargo on ballistic missiles and associated technology to Iran will be 
removed after eight years, and the embargo on conventional weapons will be lifted after five 
years.10 Iranian officials have made statements asserting that its ballistic missile arsenal and 
development program are not intended to carry weapons of mass destruction and are thus 
“outside the purview or competence of the Security Council resolution and its annexes.”11 Such 
statements signal that Iran will continue to develop the shorter-range systems that will enable 
them to conduct Hezbollah-style attacks against the GCC.  
 
With conventional weapons and ballistic missile restrictions lifted in under a decade, Iran is 
likely to increase not just the quantity but also the quality of its missiles. Reducing the circular 
error probable (CEP) of its missiles and achieving a precision-strike capability will allow Iran to 
hold targets in the Arab Gulf at risk with a higher degree of confidence, and will reduce the 
effectiveness of both active and passive defensive measures.12 Officials in the GCC also worry 
that the restrictions that still remain in place post-JCPOA will not be strictly enforced by the 
P5+1 out of fear that such enforcement may jeopardize Iran’s compliance with its nuclear 
program commitments.  
 
In addition to the military utility of intercepting Iranian missiles, BMD procurement by the GCC 
is also designed to address a political threat: the perception of American retreat from the region 
and realignment towards Iran. One cannot understand the missile defense situation in the region 
post-JCPOA without understanding the unease in Arab Gulf capitals about their security 
relationship with the United States. When the Gulf monarchies assess the United States’ 
commitment to the region, they see a country exhausted after a decade of war and occupation in 
Iraq and a country whose ability to intervene in the region is severely limited by domestic anti-
war constraints. They also see the United States shifting its focus to the Asia-Pacific region, a 
policy referred to in the United States as the “pivot to Asia.”13 The Gulf monarchies see this 
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loudly proclaimed shift in policy as an American “east of Suez” declaration, making U.S. 
guarantees to defend their security less credible. Adding to their fears of a wholesale U.S. retreat 
from the region was the U.S. response to the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, particularly what the 
Gulf regimes viewed as the abandonment of Egypt’s president and longtime U.S. ally, Hosni 
Mubarak. In a region of the world where a ruler’s or a ruling family’s hold on power is the most 
important security concern, the U.S. response to the Arab Spring created profound distrust and 
led many to question if the United States could truly be counted on to assist its authoritarian 
partners if their rule were endangered.  
 
It is within this landscape of mistrust and fear that Iran’s missile arsenal has grown and still 
grows larger and more sophisticated. Accordingly, BMD systems are procured not just to deter 
and potentially blunt Iranian missile strikes, but to keep the U.S. military and defense contractors 
integrated into the region’s security architecture.14 As the Arab Gulf states detected signs of 
American realignment away from the region, they also detected the Obama administration’s shift 
towards regional missile defense and its enthusiasm for missile defense as a substitute for other 
forms of extended deterrence. Signing on to the Obama administration’s regional BMD aims 
became a way to keep the military-to-military relationships strong. Purchasing the launchers, 
interceptors, and radars that comprise these BMD systems also kept U.S. industry focused on the 
region.15 The political component to the GCC’s interest in missile defense has always been 
significant. With the signing of the JCPOA, the GCC’s interest in missile defense is likely to be 
strengthened on both the military and political front. 
 
 
Current Status and Future Plans for GCC Missile Defense 
 
All of the GCC states have purchased or will purchase U.S.-made BMD systems (see Table 1). 
Some states have operated such systems for many years, and are upgrading their systems to 
better meet current challenges. Others are buying them for the first time. In 2013, the Obama 
administration allowed the GCC to purchase weapons collectively in a traditional American 
effort to foster cooperation and interoperability and the same arrangement the United States 
shares with its NATO allies—but so far they have only purchased weapons individually.16 The 
United Arab Emirates operates Patriot PAC-3 batteries and missiles, and Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia are upgrading their PAC-2 batteries and interceptors to PAC-3.17 Qatar has plans to 
deploy its own PAC-3 batteries as well. PAC-3, the most advanced iteration of the Patriot, is 
designed to defend small areas from ballistic missile attack with a hit-to-kill interceptor. For 
defending larger areas, the United Arab Emirates purchased the Terminal High-Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD) system, and Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have all expressed interest in 
acquiring the system.18 In addition to the BMD systems deployed by the GCC states, the United 
States also operates its own missile defenses in the region. The United States has two PAC-3 
batteries each in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.19 At sea, the U.S. Navy 
operates Aegis-equipped destroyers armed with SM-3 interceptors capable of defending against 
short- and intermediate-range missiles by intercepting them above the atmosphere.20 All of this 
amounts to a substantial amount of missile defense hardware in the region.  
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Table 1: Missile Defense Systems in the Persian Gulf21 
Country U.S. Deployments in 
Gulf Countries 
Deployed or Awaiting 
Delivery 
In Acquisition or 
Considering 






PAC-3 PAC-3, THAAD None 
Qatar PAC-3, FBX radar None PAC-3, THAAD 
Bahrain PAC-3 None None 
Kuwait PAC-3 PAC-2 upgrade to 
PAC-3 
None 
Oman None None THAAD 
Gulf Theater Aegis SM-3 N/A N/A 
 
 
Senior Obama administration officials, including former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and 
former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, have pushed for these BMD systems to be integrated 
together to provide a robust BMD capability in the region. For reasons described below, this has 
not yet happened. However, in the aftermath of the Iran negotiations, the Obama administration 
and the Gulf monarchies have issued public statements renewing their commitment to this 
objective. In a joint statement released by the White House after the U.S.-GCC Summit at Camp 
David in May of 2015, the parties “committed to develop a region-wide ballistic missile defense 
capability, including through the development of a ballistic missile early warning system.”22 The 
United States also agreed to conduct a study of the BMD capabilities in the region and assist 
with the development of the early warning system. The statement also committed the parties to 
“undertake a senior leader tabletop exercise to examine improved regional ballistic missile 
defense cooperation.”23 It remains to be seen if the JCPOA will lead the GCC states to purchase 




Obstacles on the Road to Integration  
 
One of the great paradoxes of the Obama administration’s regional BMD strategy is that less 
threatened regional actors have made greater progress on BMD integration than more threatened 
regional actors. The EPAA, the regional missile defense architecture being implemented through 
NATO, is the most advanced regional system despite the fact that Iran does not yet have the 
ability to strike most of Europe (and the system is not designed for, nor does it have a capability 
against, Russia’s strategic deterrent).24 In contrast, Iran does have a substantial—and growing—
capability to strike at targets in the GCC, yet progress towards integration within the GCC has 
been far slower and more complicated than in Europe. This can be explained primarily by three 
factors: a strong disinclination towards cooperation within the GCC; ineffective organizational 
structures within the GCC militaries; and bureaucratic obstacles that inhibit cooperation between 
the GCC and the United States.  
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Disinclination towards Cooperation within the GCC 
A full treatment of the history of the GCC, its ruling families, and its political culture is beyond 
the scope of this paper, and can be found elsewhere,25 but a basic understanding of these issues is 
key to realizing why the political cooperation necessary for achieving an integrated BMD system 
is so difficult in the Persian Gulf. The most important facet of the region’s security dynamics is 
the primacy of regime security. While the Arab Gulf monarchies certainly face external 
conventional threats—of which Iran is first and foremost—their primary security concern is their 
regimes’ ability to stay in power, and often times the biggest threats to regime security in the 
Persian Gulf are not from adversary nations’ military capabilities. Due to a long history of tribal 
rivalries, border disputes, and divergent security and economic interests, the six members of the 
GCC view each other with suspicion.26 Fears abound about neighbors interfering in each other’s 
internal affairs, leading to an atmosphere that makes close cooperation difficult. Fear of Saudi 
dominance among the smaller GCC states also precludes close cooperation—a structural issue 
given Saudi Arabia’s much larger size, population, and global political clout. Attempts at 
information sharing and integrated command and control have been, and will continue to be, 
hampered by constant suspicions of Saudi infringement on the sovereignty of the other states, 
especially in light of King Salman’s more activist foreign policy.  
 
Lastly, but no less important, is the chaos and reordering of the Middle East that has been 
unfolding since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Arab Spring uprisings that began in 
2011. Different GCC states (particularly Qatar) have had and continue to have strong 
disagreements about how to handle the instability in Egypt and the civil war in Syria. Tensions 
have gotten so bad at times that three GCC states withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar over 
anger at Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and divergent foreign policy.27 Such strong 
disagreements about pressing regional security issues, coupled with a history of mistrust within 
the GCC, make cooperation on a project as complicated and compromise-intensive as missile 
defense an extremely difficult endeavor, even with the threat from Iran looming ever larger. 
 
Organizational Structures of the Arab Gulf Militaries 
The GCC’s member states are often lumped together when in fact there are many important 
differences between them. However, they do share certain traits in common, including dynastic 
rule that relies on oil income for its budgets and to provide largesse to its citizens. Peculiarities in 
the development of many state and societal institutions have resulted from this form of 
governance, including the GCC’s militaries and security services.28 As stated earlier, the top 
priority of these governments is regime security and the ruling family’s hold on power. Thus, the 
militaries and security services of these monarchies are designed with “coup-proofing” in 
mind—the structuring of the armed forces in such a way that prevents their ability to harm or 
overthrow the regime.29 Some such strategies for achieving this include: deliberately keeping 
certain units weak and unprofessional; limiting communication between units; creating multiple 
security and intelligence services to surveil and protect against each other; and placing regime 
loyalists in leadership roles. In the GCC, military leadership positions are often awarded to 
balance or reward different factions of the ruling family. This creates parallel military forces 
with unnecessary redundancy, commanded by (sometimes unqualified) members of the royal 
family who jealously guard their turf. Such organizational structures may prevent the military 
from posing an internal threat to the regime and serve as an effective vehicle for patronage, but it 
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is not conducive to cooperation, either between units in the same military or between the GCC’s 
militaries.   
 
Authoritarian states that face significant external threats, or for whom territorial expansion is 
integral to the regime, often avoid falling prey to the coup-proofing strategies that result in poor 
military performance.30 Given the chaotic nature of the Middle East, the Arab Gulf states 
certainly face external threats, so why haven’t they adopted the model of authoritarian regimes 
with effective militaries? There are two possible reasons for this. First, the tribal and sectarian 
fault lines that run deep through the region mandate security forces that are inherently more 
inward-focused than might be necessary in other regions. Second, the Arab Gulf states receive 
protection from external threats from the United States, which has a decades-long history of 
providing security for the region.31 Of late, the faith of the GCC states in the commitment of the 
United States to the region is shaky, but these militaries all developed under the protection of the 
American security umbrella. The legacy effects of this development will be difficult to 
overcome. Little has been specifically written on how the organizational structures of the Arab 
Gulf militaries have affected missile defense cooperation, but it is safe to say that it has played a 
role, perhaps a significant one, in retarding integration and interoperability across the GCC.  
 
Bureaucratic Obstacles between the United States and the GCC 
Another, although lesser, factor in the GCC’s difficulty in progressing towards an interoperable 
BMD system is bureaucratic obstacles with the United States. U.S.-GCC relations are close, but 
suffer symptoms of a patron-client alliance structure—one between a strong democratic state and 
a series of weak authoritarian ones. The authoritarian and regime security-oriented nature of 
these monarchies has limited the United States’ willingness to sell or transfer certain 
technologies to these countries for fear that they may be used inappropriately or they will find 
their way into a third party’s hands. This fear is compounded by the fact that many of the non-
state actors of great concern to the United States, such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, have 
sympathizers within the GCC’s societies and militaries. Many officials in the GCC find the slow 
and sometimes fickle nature of U.S. equipment and technology transfer that results from these 
considerations—in addition to the already slow and complex export controls process—insulting 
and unhelpful towards building effective regional capabilities. This is an issue of contention in 
U.S.-GCC relations overall that has likely impacted cooperation on present missile defense 
plans.    
 
 
Lessons from the EPAA and their Salience in the Gulf 
 
In light of the difficulties facing missile defense in the Persian Gulf, what lessons might be 
gleaned from the more advanced and robust regional missile defense project in Europe, the 
EPAA? Obvious differences aside, there are some structural parallels between the strategic 
picture in Europe and in the Persian Gulf. Both NATO and the GCC are collections of states that 
fear a regional adversary in close proximity to their borders, and both view missile defense as a 
political instrument, not just or even primarily as a military instrument. If the development of the 
EPAA is any indication, there are two main lessons to be learned with implications for the Arab 
Gulf.  
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First, while missile defense is a capability of great interest, it is not a substitute for other 
capabilities that regional allies deem essential to deterrence and their security.32 Many NATO 
allies are growing increasingly concerned about Russia’s behavior given its actions in Ukraine 
and its more aggressive interference of NATO airspace. Vis-à-vis Russia, the EPAA’s value is in 
the physical presence of U.S. personnel and equipment since the interceptors do not threaten 
Russia’s nuclear deterrent. But they also do not counter the capabilities Russia might bring to 
bear in any future action—hybrid or otherwise—against a NATO ally. Countries within the 
NATO alliance, especially those closer to Russia, are seeking more offensive weapons that 
would actually be capable of complicating a Russian ground invasion of their territory—
something missile defense does not do and indeed cannot do in its present configuration. Missile 
defense is an important political demonstration of commitment, but is insufficient by itself in the 
face of increasing Russian hostility. 
 
A similar paradigm exists in the Persian Gulf. Missile defenses respond to a more direct and 
immediate threat in the Persian Gulf than they do in Europe, but they are not a substitute for the 
greater diplomatic and military role the GCC states wish the United States would play in the 
region. As Saudi Arabia battles Houthi rebels in Yemen and remains fearful of Iran’s control 
over Shiite militias in Iraq and elsewhere, the Arab Gulf states are most interested in U.S. 
diplomatic efforts to counter Iran’s growing influence, as well as more advanced strike 
capabilities to enable greater unilateral conventional action. Selling additional BMD assets to the 
GCC states will not make up for the fact that they perceive U.S. diplomatic pressure on Iran to be 
diminishing, or the fact that strike capabilities are subject to slow and complex export regulations 
and concerns about Israel’s qualitative military edge.33  
 
Second, the EPAA project demonstrates how difficult BMD cooperation and integration is, even 
under more favorable political conditions. Different NATO allies have different perceptions of 
the threats posed by Russia and Iran, which makes some countries more motivated to contribute 
to the EPPA than others. On the BMD integration and cooperation front, NATO, despite having 
a long history of cooperation and higher levels of trust, has still run into difficulties. A 
Government Accountability Office report from 2014 highlights many of these challenges, 
including an incident where Patriot batteries deployed to Turkey were unable to be used for 
weeks due to a lack of prior planning and preparation.34 Uncoordinated practices and procedures, 
and intelligence-sharing restrictions, created an embarrassing situation between close allies on a 
project that has been a main focus for the alliance. If NATO’s more advanced EPAA is suffering 
from such cooperation difficulties, it is unlikely that the GCC states will fare better.  
 
 
The U.S. Role in the Persian Gulf Going Forward  
 
In light of American interests, U.S. BMD objective in the region—encouraging integration and 
interoperability to create a region-wide missile defense architecture that is greater than the sum 
of its parts—is the correct objective. But the United States should have no illusions that this will 
be achieved quickly, or even at all. It is possible that the anxiety in Arab Gulf capitals caused by 
the JCPOA will result in a renewed and good-faith effort by the GCC states to engage in the 
information sharing and joint doctrine development that are necessary for BMD interoperability. 
But it is also possible that continued differences on regional security issues and structural 
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deficiencies in their militaries will continue to stifle progress toward BMD interoperability, even 
post-JCPOA. Given this reality, the United States must temper its expectations and focus on two 
shorter-term objectives that will have quicker returns on both the military and political fronts.  
The first focus should be a serious push for the information sharing necessary for a region-wide 
early warning system. This objective was specifically singled out during President Obama’s May 
2015 summit with GCC leaders. A region-wide early warning capability would consist of the 
radars and other sensors in other GCC countries (and linked to U.S. assets in the region) talking 
to each other. It would not involve the sharing of interceptors or a joint doctrine for regional 
defense. This is a first step towards true regional defense, and should be achievable in a shorter 
timeframe with a committed U.S. effort.  But it would have a meaningful impact on each state’s 
ability to unilaterally defend itself with its own interceptors. Due to the short missile flight times 
in the region (six minutes or less) and the topography, the earlier an incoming missile can be 
detected and tracked, the easier it will be to shoot down that missile. If a threat heading for one 
country is detected first by a radar in another country, it would be extremely valuable if this 
information could be shared in real time to enable the threatened country to better defend itself.35  
 
The second focus should be improving the United States’ own interoperability. Currently, 
different BMD systems operated by the U.S. military are unable to talk to each other. This makes 
it difficult to use the best interceptor to defeat the incoming threat. Northrop Grumman is 
currently working on an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) 
that will enable the sensors associated with different BMD systems to communicate, alerting the 
warfighter and enabling him or her to select the best interceptor available to engage the incoming 
missile.36 However, the IBCS is not slated to reach initial operational capacity until 2019.37 
Efforts should be made to speed up the development and procurement of this system. Talks 
should begin now with the GCC states about selling them the system to improve the capabilities 
of the BMD assets they already (or will soon) operate.  
 
 
Consequences of a Reduced U.S. Role on Regional Missile Defense 
 
Reducing the U.S. role in assisting the GCC states with missile defense will have strong 
operational and political consequences. Operationally, the GCC states rely on the United States 
to sell them BMD equipment and help them operate it. Even under a dramatically reduced 
presence in the region, it is unlikely that such sales and military-to-military cooperation will 
cease. However, any BMD integration that may take place within the GCC in the future will rely 
heavily on U.S. leadership and persistent pressure and involvement. Failing to provide such 
leadership will result in slower progress towards BMD integration than already exists today.  
 
Even more pronounced would be the political consequences. U.S.-GCC relations are already at a 
relatively low point—any backtracking on an issue that concerns them, such as missile defense, 
would be interpreted as a validation of GCC suspicions of American abandonment. This 
perception has already had an effect on GCC behavior. Saudi Arabia’s campaign in Yemen 
would likely not be taking place were it not for the Kingdom’s anger at Washington’s thawing 
relations with Iran and (from its perspective) inaction against Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the 
Islamic State. BMD cooperation has been one of the few areas where the United States has 
shown a willingness to increase its involvement in the region. Reducing this role, for whatever 
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reason, would be catastrophic for U.S.-GCC relations, and could have consequences in the 





The Obama administration’s objective of BMD integration in the region is moving slower than 
expected, and may not be achievable in a reasonable timeframe. The United States should focus 
on smaller steps—such as an integrated early warning system—that would be valuable but would 
fall short of true interoperability. The United States must also realize that missile defense will not 
serve as an effective substitute for other forms of assurance and cooperation that the Arab Gulf 
states feel is necessary for their security. Missile defense is an important, but by no means 
sufficient, mechanism of extended deterrence. In the absence of additional forms of security 
assistance, including the more assertive U.S. leadership role that the GCC states desire from the 
United States, missile defense will not serve as a credible commitment to the security of the Arab 
Gulf monarchies. That being said, the goal of a regional missile defense architecture is a worthy 
one. The United States should continue working towards this goal—albeit with a realistic 
understanding of what is achievable given the realities of the region.         
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Timeline 
 
1980 – 1988: Ballistic missiles widely used by Iraq and Iran during their eight-year war. Ballistic 
missiles used by Iraq against Iran’s capital, Tehran, were extremely effective and contributed to 
Iran’s decision to accept a ceasefire. 
 
1981: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman form the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) to address growing regional instability. 
 
1991: Iraq again uses ballistic missiles, this time against Saudi Arabia and Israel. Little damage 
was caused, but their use by Saddam Hussein demonstrated the political utility of ballistic 
missiles.  
 
2006: Hezbollah fires 4,000 rockets into northern Israel, again demonstrating the political value 
of even short-range and unguided rocket and missile strikes.  
 
2006: The George W. Bush administration launches the Gulf Security Dialogue to strengthen 
U.S.-GCC defense cooperation. Missile defense is an important item on the agenda.  
 
2010: The U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Review shifts U.S. policy toward a greater emphasis on 
regional defense systems, including in the Persian Gulf.  
 
2011: The United Arab Emirates becomes the first foreign customer of the Terminal High-
Altitude Area Defense missile defense system.  
 
2012: The Barack Obama administration established the Gulf Strategic Cooperation Forum to 
enhance security cooperation. Missile defense issues have featured prominently in Strategic 
Cooperation Forum discussions.  
 
2013: The P5+1 and Iran agree to the Joint Plan of Action, which consisted of a short-term 
freeze on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief to provide both parties with 
space to negotiate a final agreement.  
 
2015: The P5+1 sign the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which provides Iran with 
sanctions relief in exchange for limits on its nuclear program. Iran’s ballistic missile program 
and state sponsorship of terrorism were not dealt with sufficiently according to many of Iran’s 
Arab neighbors.  
 
2016: Iran conducts ballistic missile tests after the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan 






Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century | Paper 6                   12 
																																								 																					
1 For more on the Obama administration’s missile defense strategy, see Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile 
Defense Review Report, February 2010, 
http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf. 
2 The JCPOA was signed on July 14, 2015. Implementation Day, or the day that the IAEA certified that Iran has 
complied with the terms of the agreement sufficiently to receive sanctions relief, was January 16, 2016. For more on 
the JCPOA and the steps taken by Iran to comply with the agreement, see U.S. Department of State, “Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action,” http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/.   
3 F. Gregory Gause, III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 75-83.  
4 Dennis M. Gormley, Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security, 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 17.  
5 Ibid., 32-33.  
6 Yoel Guzansky and Yiftah S. Shapir, “Iran Goes Ballistic,” Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2015), 
http://www.meforum.org/4911/iran-goes-ballistic#_ftn1.  
7 Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon, (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 259.  
8 Guzansky and Shapir.  
9 Debra Kamin and Jessica Steinberg, “Tel Avivians show their soaring affection for the Iron Dome,” Times of 
Israel, July 25, 2014, http://www.timesofisrael.com/tel-avivians-show-their-soaring-affection-for-the-iron-dome/.  




12 Shahryar Pasandideh, “Iran’s Missile Forces are Increasing in Range, Accuracy and Lethality,” World Politics 
Review, October 14, 2015, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/16942/iran-s-missile-forces-are-increasing-
in-range-accuracy-and-lethality.  
13 The anxiety caused by the Pivot to Asia has been widely discussed. See, for instance, the report authored by 
Afshon Ostovar, on his PASCC project “Deterrence and the Future of U.S.-GCC Defense Cooperation: A Strategic 
Dialogue Event,” Center for Naval Analyses, July 2015, http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/45796.   
14 Richard Weitz, “U.S. Pushes Missile Defense to Reassure Gulf Partners,” World Politics Review, August 4, 2015, 
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/16377/u-s-pushes-missile-defense-to-reassure-gulf-partners.  
15 An example of major defense contractor interest in the Persian Gulf can be seen from Raytheon’s vice president of 
integrated air and missile defense, who stated that “In 2008, when the United Arab Emirates placed an order for a 
significant number of Patriot fire units, that really kicked off the resurgence of Patriot.” Angus Batey, “UAE is 
Driving Next Generation Patriot,” Aviation Week Network, November 7, 2015, http://aviationweek.com/dubai-air-
show-2015/uae-driving-next-generation-patriot.  
16 Weitz.  
17 Michael Elleman and Wafa Alsayed, “Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation in the Arabian Gulf,” in Regional 
Missile Defense from a Global Perspective, ed. Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Peter Dombrowski, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2015), 161-167.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Missile Defense Agency, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense,” http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_bmd.html.  
21 Elleman and Alsayed, 161.  




24 For a technical analysis of the EPAA’s capabilities, see, inter alia, Jaganath Sankaran, “The United States’ 
European Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System: Defending Against Iranian Threats Without Diluting 
the Russian Deterrent,” RAND, 2015, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR957.html.  
25 See, for example: Gause; and Christopher Davidson, ed., Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf Monarchies, 
(London: C. Hurst & Co., 2011).  
26 Ibid.  
Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century | Paper 6                   13 
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																																			 	
27 Angus McDowall and Amina Bakr, “Three Gulf Arab states recall envoys in rift with Qatar,” Reuters, March 5, 
2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/05/us-gulf-qatar-ambassadors-idUSBREA2413N20140305.   
28 Steffen Hertog, “Rentier militaries in the Gulf states: the price of coup-proofing,” International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 43, no. 3 (2011): 400-402.  
29 See: Hertog; Laurence Louer, “Sectarianism and Coup-Proofing Strategies in Bahrain,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 36, no. 2 (2013): 245-260, particularly pp. 251-252; and James T. Quinlivan, “Coup-Proofing: Its Practice 
and Consequences in the Middle East,” International Security 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 131-165.  
30 For an excellent examination of coup-proofing and military effectiveness, see Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s 
Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), especially the 
introduction and the conclusion.  
31 For a history of the U.S. role in the Persian Gulf, see Michael A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of 
America’s Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833-1992, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).  
32 Ari Kattan, “Missile Defense: State of Play and Future Evolution,” NATO Defense College, March 2015, 5, 
http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=780.  
33 Jon B. Alterman, et al., Federated Defense in the Middle East, (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, September 2015), 26-28, 
http://csis.org/publication/federated-defense-middle-east.  
34 Government Accountability Office, “Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Address Implementation Issues 
and Estimate Long-Term Costs for European Capabilities,” April 2014, 13-14, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662492.pdf.  
35 Thomas Karako, “Getting the GCC to Cooperate on Missile Defense,” War on the Rocks, May 13, 2015, 
http://warontherocks.com/2015/05/getting-the-gcc-to-cooperate-on-missile-defense/.  
36 Northrup Grumman, “Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS),” 
http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/IBCS/Documents/IBCS_datasheet.pdf.  
37 Jen Judson, “US Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense System Defeats Cruise-Missile Target,” Defense 
News, November 13, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense-news/2015/11/13/us-armys-integrated-air-
and-missile-defense-system-defeats-cruise-missile-target/75716198/.  
